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ABSTRACT

This dissertation research seeks to examine the role o f organizational insiders’
psychological capital (PsyCap) on the performance o f protection motivated behaviors
(PMBs). The dissertation examines the role o f PsyCap through three studies which were
conducted for this research. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), the responses
from four distinct samples were analyzed. The results largely support the significant role
o f PsyCap in information security. The first study takes an expectancy theory (Vroom,
1964) approach and found that PsyCap was a significant consequence o f insiders’
security-related expectancy dimensions. Additionally, expectancy theory was found to be
an appropriate frame-work for promoting PMBs.
The expectancy dimensions were found to be trainable through security,
education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs, and were significantly related to
the performance o f PMBs. The second study draws upon the broaden-and-build theory
(Fredrickson, 2004) to examine the role o f PsyCap within an emotional security
framework. The second study found that the broaden-and-build theory explained the
performance o f PMBs through a direct relationship between emotion and behavior as
well as through an indirect relationship between emotions and an insider’s PsyCap.
Finally, the dissertation examines the role o f PsyCap in information security from
a framework o f behavioral complexity (Wu et al., 2010) in the third study. The results of
the third study indicate that PsyCap is a significant contributor to a model o f security

behavioral complexity which is shown to effectively influence insiders’ performance o f
PMBs. Implications o f the results on both practice and research are discussed along with
limitations to the current studies. The overall contributions o f the dissertation are
highlighted and areas o f future research evidenced by the findings are raised.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In today’s knowledge economy, organizational success is increasingly reliant
upon the effective utilization o f organizational information systems (IS). In order to
leverage the capabilities enabled by new technology, organizations often provide
employees with access to information and information systems on an ongoing basis. This
increased access provided by enterprise-wide systems and ubiquitous computing exposes
the organization’s systems to risks beyond the proximate control o f the IT staff (Vroom et
al., 2004). Given this complexity, it is not an understatement to say that the
organization’s resources and systems are largely at the mercy o f the actions o f all insiders
with access to the IS (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; D'Arcy &
Hovav, 2007; Moore, Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008). In fact, According to a recent survey
o f security practitioners, the complexity o f the security environment, not a lack o f
resources was the most widely reported cause o f information security concerns
(Richardson, 2010/2011).
The reliance upon the behavior o f employees for organizational information
security led to the genesis o f a branch o f information security research deemed behavioral
information security, behavioral information security is defined as the study o f “the
human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity o f information
systems” (Stanton et al., 2006b, p. 263). To date, most research into behavioral
1

information security has been in line with the perspective that users are generally bad
actors, and any increase in user computing ability can be associated with an increased
threat to the organization (Straub et al., 1990; Zafar et al., 2009). Recently, however, it
has become known that many organizational insiders have requisite knowledge and
ability to affect organizational security positively through their use o f and interactions
with technology and information systems in the workplace (Posey et al., 2013).
Organizational insiders are all individuals (e.g., full- and part-time employees, temporary
workers, board members) who have access to organizationally relevant information while
fulfilling their duties (Posey et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 1998). The volitional behaviors
organizational insiders can enact to protect (1) organizationally relevant information
within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that information is stored,
collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from information-security threats are
protection-motivated behaviors (PMBs) (Posey et al., 2013).
The shift o f behavioral information security to consider the security abilities o f
the average employee has mirrored a similar shift in psychology brought about by the
positive psychology movement (Seligman et al., 2000). Positive psychology is “the study
o f the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning
o f people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 2005). Drawing on positive psychology,
this dissertation extends the body o f knowledge in behavioral information security by
considering the impact o f employees’ psychological capital (PsyCap) on the securityrelated outcomes o f an organization. PsyCap is a higher order construct made up o f core
tenets o f positive psychology conceptualized as hope, self-efficacy, resilience, and
optimism (Luthans et al., 2007a).

3

Psychological Capital
As a higher-order construct, PsyCap is composed o f distinct yet related core
tenets o f positive psychology o f hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy. Positive
psychology is interested in “optimal functioning” or what is referred to in its literature as
“flourishing” (Seligman et al., 2000). A key characteristic o f positive psychology that
makes it an ideal candidate for consideration in behavioral information security—
especially dealing with the security behaviors o f insiders— is that it is a branch o f
traditional psychology that has the “average person” as its subject (Sheldon et al., 2001).
Therefore, positive psychology is fertile ground for the cultivation o f appropriate security
behaviors of ordinary organizational insiders, and PsyCap provides a succinct and wellestablished construct for investigating the role o f positive psychology in information
security. The four subconstructs o f PsyCap are described next and are summarized in
Table 1.1.
PsyCap hope is a “positive motivational state that is based on an interactively
derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b) pathways (planning
to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a). PsyCap resilience “is
characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face o f significant risk or
adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al., 2002). Resilience
can also be thought o f simply as “the positive psychological capacity to rebound, to
‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive change,
progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al., 2007a).
PsyCap optimism is the characteristic o f individuals who “expect things to go their way,
and generally believe that good rather than bad things will happen to them” (Scheier et
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al., 1985). PsyCap self-efficacy is a role-breadth self-efficacy and is defined as “the
employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to mobilize the motivation,
cognitive resources or courses o f action needed to successfully execute a specific task
within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66; Luthans et al., 2007a).

Table 1.1
Summary o f PsyCap Characteristics

PsyCap
Compone
nt
PsyCap
SelfEfficacy

PsyCap
Hope

PsyCap
Optimism

PsyCap
Resilience

Definition

“ [T]he employee’s conviction or
confidence about his or her abilities to
mobilize the motivation, cognitive
resources or courses o f action needed to
successfully execute a specific task
within a given context” (Stajkovic et al.,
1998, p. 66)
“ [Pjositive motivational state that is
based on an interactively derived sense
o f successful (a) agency (goal directed
energy) and (b) pathways (planning to
meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p.
287).
Characterizes individuals who “expect
things to go their way, and generally
believe that good rather than bad things
will happen to them.” (Scheier et al.,
1985).
“[T]he positive psychological capacity to
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from
adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or
even positive change, progress and
increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002,
p. 702)

Micro-Development

•
•
•
•

Mastery experiences
Modeling and vicarious
learning
Social persuasion
Physiological and psychological
arousal

•
•
•

Goal-setting
Participation
Contingency planning for
alternative pathways to attain
goals

•
•
•

Leniency for the past
Appreciation for the present
Opportunity-seeking for the
future

•

Asset-focused strategies such as
enhancing employability
Risk-focused strategies such as
proactive avoidance of
adversity
Process-focused strategies to
influence the interpretation o f
adverse events

•

•

Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et
al. (2007b).

Though a relatively new construct, PsyCap, has already been widely accepted and
used extensively in the field o f organizational behavior and beyond (Avey et al., 2009;
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Walumbwa et al., 2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011; Abbas et al., 2012;
Wang et al., 2012). One reason that PsyCap has been so widely used is that it has been
shown to be composed o f characteristics that are state-like rather than trait-like. Though
research has often relied on context to inform the true distinction between state and trait
(Allen et al., 1981), an important distinction can be made between trait-like and state-like
dispositions (Zuckerman, 1983; Fugate et al., 2012). This differentiation is especially
critical in a security context because PsyCap, a construct composed o f state-like
characteristic, has been shown to be developable (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al.,
2006a; Peterson et al., 2011). Therefore, any benefits to firm security that can be shown
to be attributable to PsyCap can be influenced by an organization through what could be
thought o f as an investment in employees’ PsyCap.
Additionally, malleability is an important criterion for inclusion into behavioral
information security. To fully recognize the potential benefits o f considering PsyCap in
behavioral information security, the methods for developing PsyCap should also be
considered. As PsyCap is a latent construct composed o f four underlying characteristics,
it can be developed at the facet level by developing each o f the individual characteristics
(Luthans et al., 2006b; Luthans et al., 2006a). A thorough treatment o f PsyCap “micro
intervention” can be found in Luthans et al. (2007b), and is summarized in Table 1.1.
PsyCap is a higher-order reflective construct, which means that the facets o f PsyCap vary
together (Jarvis et al., 2003; Bagozzi, 2011). Building PsyCap at the facet level should
take advantage o f the reported synergistic relationship among the indicators and lead to
an increase in the overall PsyCap construct (Luthans et al., 2007b).

As the name implies, PsyCap can be thought o f quite literally as a factor o f
psychological production. In parallel to the traditional factors o f economic production,
land (or natural resources), labor, and capital (Beer, 1980; Huettner et al., 1982), PsyCap
meets the criteria o f a psychological resource (Avey et al., 2009). PsyCap can therefore
be viewed through the lens o f resource theory (Luthans et al., 2007b; Hobfoll, 1989;
Hobfoll, 2002). Hobfoll’s (1989) describes the role o f resources, stipulating that
individuals require resources for functioning, and they will seek to gain available
resources and when possible conserve unnecessarily expended resources. Thus, the
conservation o f resources has two components: the building o f resources and the
conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a resource can be built by either micro-intervention
(see Table 1.1) or by macro-intervention such as a supportive climate (Luthans et al.,
2008). In reference to conservation, resources are either “centrally valued in their own
right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can be
viewed as adaptive in that not only does PsyCap embody a positive psychological state,
as a psychological construct it serves meaningful ends. For instance, PsyCap has been
shown to provide a necessary psychological resource for psychological well-being
(Culbertson et al., 2010).

Theoretical Foundation of Dissertation
This dissertation includes three studies which each examine a novel and unique
approach to behavioral information security. As implied in the name o f the tome,
common to the studies is an examination o f the role o f insider’s PsyCap. The first study
is grounded in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) and simultaneously assesses the
responsiveness o f expectancy dimensions to training and the impact o f expectancy
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dimensions on motivation to and withdrawal from protective security behaviors.

The

second study examines the impact o f emotion in information security and is grounded in
the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2004). The final study develops and examines
a model o f security behavioral complexity (Wu et al., 2010), consisting o f security
behavioral repertoire, security differentiation, and PsyCap. The succeeding sections
provide a brief articulation o f the theoretical foundation o f each o f the three security
studies including PsyCap.

Study 1: A Multi-Dimensional Assessment o f Organizational
Insiders ’ Performance o f Protection-Motivated Behaviors:
An Expectancy Theory Approach
Originally developed by Vroom (1964), expectancy theory has been used in
numerous studies involving motivation in the workplace (Van Eerde et al., 1996).

Expectancy theory enables a multidimensional diagnostic approach to motivation
(Sanchez et al., 2000; Ilgen et al., 1981; Courtney et al., 1983; DeSanctis, 1983).
Expectancy theory— also referred to as VIE theory— offers a set o f three motivational
antecedents consisting o f (1) valence, (2) instrumentality, and (3) expectancy (Ellingson
et al., 2011). Valence is the preference o f one outcome over another (or all others)
(Vroom, 1964). Instrumentality is an individual’s perception that successfully enacting a
behavior will lead to an ultimate outcome (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy is an “actionoutcome association” and is defined as is a perception that an individual’s efforts will
lead to the intended behavior (Vroom, 1964).
This study explores the impact o f expectancy measures on insiders’ motivation to
and withdrawal from performance o f PMBs. In addition to the direct effect o f expectancy
measures, it also explores antecedents and consequences o f expectancies. First the impact
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o f security education, training and awareness (SETA) on expectancy dimensions is
assessed. SETA programs are the mechanism by which organizations inform users o f
security threats, establish the responsibilities o f the employees, and detail the
consequences o f failing to comply (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub et al., 1998). Finally, the
impact o f expectancies on insiders’ PsyCap in addition to the role o f PsyCap in the
motivation to and withdrawal from PMBs is assessed.

The research model for the

expectancy theory study is shown in Figure 1.1.

Security
Expectancy

Security
Velence

SETA

PMBe

PeyCap

H3

Security
Withdrawal

Firat Order Formative
First Order Reflective
1 Second Order Reflective

Figure. 1.1 Chapter 1 Research Model

Study 2: The Adaptive Role o f Emotion in Information Security:
Broadening the Theoretical Repertoire
As in the broader organizational literature (Fredrickson, 1998), where the IS
security literature has considered emotions at all, it has most often considered the role o f
negative emotions such as fear (e.g. Johnston et al., 2010). However, emotional stimuli
often elicit multiple emotions o f varying intensities simultaneously (Lazarus et al., 1984;
Lazarus, 1991; Beaudry et al., 2010). The broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998;
Fredrickson, 2001) provides a multi-dimensional framework o f emotions which includes

9
the often neglected positive emotions. The broaden-and-build theory posits that positive
emotions “broaden the scope o f attention and thought-action repertoires,” (Fredrickson et
al., 2005) while simultaneously building lasting psychological resources (Fredrickson,
1998; Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2005). An individual’s thought-action
repertoire is the collection o f the thoughts and behaviors which are cognitively available
in the moment o f action (Fredrickson et al., 2005).
Organizations often play on the emotions o f employees to elicit security behaviors
by employing appeals to emotion, such as fear (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al.,
2010; Herath et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009). Yet, as the role o f emotion becomes
increasingly important in IS (Beaudry et al., 2010), even the established role o f fear has
been called into question (Crossler et al., 2012). The broaden-and-build theory explains
that certain emotional responses to security threats (i.e. emotions such as fear and
anxiety) may have a confounding effect on proactive security behaviors such as PMBs
(Fredrickson, 2001). The goal o f this study is to integrate a framework o f emotions
(Beaudry et al., 2010) with the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) in
order to examine the adaptive role o f emotions in information security. The research
model for the Chapter 2 is shown in Figure 1.2.

10

Challenge Emotions
Hope

Positive Affect

Interest

Achievement Emotions
Happiness
Pride

PsyCap

PMBs

Loss Emotions
Sad
Anger

r Avoidance Emotions
Anxiety
Negative Affect
Fear

Figure 1.2 Chapter 2 Research Model

Study 3: Security Behavioral Complexity and Psychological Capital:
An Empirical Examination
The protective roles (e.g. PMBs) which insiders may enact in order to protect the
Firm’s information and IS may be unrelated to or even in direct contrast with an insider’s
formal job description. In this way, PMBs are enacted alongside the various
organizational roles held by all insiders with access to informational resources, creating
behavioral complexity for insiders (Posey et al., 2013). Behavioral complexity refers to
“the ability to act and play multiple roles that call for diverse and even competing
behaviors” (Wu et al., 2010, p. 818). Hooijberg (1996) established that behavioral
complexity is comprised o f two distinct components: (1) behavioral repertoire and (2)
behavioral differentiation. Behavioral repertoire is the portfolio o f roles an individual

performs and his or her ability to perform multiple roles, and behavioral differentiation is
the ability to “switch from role to role at appropriate times to handle paradoxes and
contradictions mandated by one’s jo b ” (Wu et al., 2010, p. 818).
Insiders’ PMB complexity has recently been espoused as an antecedent to the
performance o f PMBs (Posey et al., 2013), but has yet to be empirically examined.
Complementary to behavioral complexity are personal resources such as PsyCap which
equip an individual to deal with the tensions o f divergent demands (Smith et al., 2011).
This study reports an empirical examination o f a model o f behavioral security
complexity, which considers the impact o f PMB complexity and PsyCap simultaneously.
The research model for the Chapter 3 study is shown in Figure 1.3.

Repertoire of PMBs

Security Behavioral
Differentiation

Protection Motivated
Behaviors

BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY
Psychological Capital
First-O rder Reflective

r
t

"1 Second-Order Reflective
First-O rder Formative

Figure 1.3 Chapter 3 Research Model

The remainder o f the work is dedicated to the development and empirical
examination o f the three studies outlined in this chapter. Each study is self-contained
within its own chapter (chapters two, three, and four, respectively). The final chapter of
the dissertation, chapter five, concludes the work with a summary o f the findings.

CHAPTER 2

A MULTI DIMENSIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
ORGANIZATIONAL INSIDERS’ PERFORMANCE
OF PROTECTION-MOTIVATED BEHAVIORS:
AN EXPECTANCY THEORY APPROACH

Introduction
In today’s technology-driven economic environment, many employees have
unprecedented access to their organizations' information and information system (IS),
(Dhillon et al., 2001; Zafar et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2006b; Stanton et al., 2006a). This
increased access provided by enterprise-wide systems and ubiquitous computing often
exposes the organization’s systems to risks beyond the proximate control o f the IT staff
(Vroom et al., 2004). It is increasingly difficult for organizations to maintain information
security, as 54% of firms report an inability to determine if off-site employees are using
technology and informational resources within corporate and regulatory requirements
(Ponemon, 2013).

These realities have led many practitioners and academicians to

recognize that organizational information security is at the mercy o f the actions o f those
with access to the firm’s information and IS (Moore et al., 2008; Boss et al., 2009;
D'Arcy et al., 2007).
The study o f “the human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality,
and integrity o f information systems” is behavioral information security (Stanton et al.,
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2006b, p. 263). Behavioral information security research examines the impact o f
organizational insiders’ behavior on information security— often in order to assess or
deter the diminution o f security brought on by insider behavior (e.g. Shaw et al., 1998;
Boss et al., 2009; Vroom et al., 2004; Willison et al., 2009; Greitzer et al., 2008; Zafar et
al., 2009; Straub et al., 1990; Sasse et al., 2001). Organizational insiders are individuals
(e.g., full- and part-time employees, temporary workers, board members) who have
access to organizationally relevant information while fulfilling their duties (Posey et al.,
2013; Shaw et al., 1998). However, just as insiders may jeopardize information security
by behaving maliciously (e.g. Straub et al., 1990; Posey et al., 2011; Whitman, 2003) or
carelessly (e.g. Johnson, 2008; Workman et al., 2008; Im et al., 2005), insiders who
actively and conscientiously work toward the protection o f the firm are able to increase
information security (Posey et al., 2013; Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005).
Posey et al. (2013) comprehensively identified many o f the security-enhancing
behaviors an insider can perform by developing a taxonomy o f protection-motivated
behaviors (PMBs) . PMBs are the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact
to protect (1) organizationally relevant information within their firms and (2) the
computer-based IS in which that information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or
manipulated from information-security threats (Posey et al., 2013). PMBs include a broad
swath o f protective behaviors ranging from maintaining general security etiquette to
identifying and reporting suspicious co-worker behavior (Posey et al., 2013). Therefore,
in addition to deterring the harmful behavior o f some corrupted and/or heedless
employees, effective security requires that organizations motivate insiders to reach their
protective potential through the performance o f PMBs.
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To examine insiders’ motivation to perform PMBs, I employ a multi-dimensional
model o f motivation grounded in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy theory is
a behavioral process theory (Brouer et al., 2011), which explains motivation as a product
o f both individual preferences and perceptions o f outcome probabilities (Vroom, 1964).
This essay evaluates the impact o f expectancy measures on insiders’ motivation to and
withdrawal from performance o f PMBs. In addition, to more fully explicate the role o f
expectancy theory in eliciting protective behaviors, this research includes key antecedents
and consequences to the expectancy measures as well. First, the role o f security
education, training and awareness (SETA) is examined as an antecedent to expectancy
theory. SETA programs are the mechanism by which organizations inform users of
security threats, establish the responsibilities o f employees, and detail the consequences
o f failing to comply (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub et al., 1998). Second, the role o f
expectancy theory in building insiders’ psychological capital (PsyCap) is analyzed.
PsyCap is a higher order construct conceptualized as hope, self-efficacy, resilience, and
optimism (Luthans et al., 2007a) that has emerged out o f the positive psychology
movement (e.g. Seligman et al., 2000).

Background
Driving the importance o f information security is a realization that protection of
information resources is paramount for organizational success and should be a primary
goal o f the organization (Siponen et al., 2010; Herath et al., 2009; Dhillon et al., 2006).
Information security has most often placed primary focus on technical methods and
managerial approaches to safeguard against security-threatening behavior (Zafar et al.,
2009; Choobineh et al., 2007). PMBs, however, imply a broadened view o f the insider
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from merely a threat to a potential protector o f information security (Posey et al., 2013;
Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005).
Organizations seeking to motivate employees to protect the organization tend to
focus on employees’ compliance with formalized security policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010;
D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath et al., 2009; Vroom et al., 2004). Security policy compliance
is an important goal for any organization, without which the policy itself is meaningless
(Siponen, 2000). Yet security policy compliance represents only one

subset o f the

protective behaviors in which an insider can engage (Posey et al., 2013; Albrechtsen et
al., 2009). Additionally, policies are often constructed with a negative frame, such that
they generally focus on telling employees what not to do to deter unwanted behavior such
as computer abuse rather than telling employees what to do to protect the organization
(Lee et al., 2002). Security research has also investigated individuals’ intentions to adopt
software solutions such as anti-malware software (Lee et al., 2009) or anti-spyware
software (Johnston et al., 2010). These software solutions are important safeguards;
however, they are most often adopted by the IT department and represent an
organization’s investment in IT security rather than the motivation o f insiders’ to protect
the organization (Kumar et al., 2008; August et al., 2006).

E xp ectancy T h eory

Expectancy theory has been used in numerous studies involving motivation in the
workplace (Van Eerde et al., 1996). Expectancy theory has strong empirical support
(Burton et al., 1992), is straightforward and easily understood by both practitioners and
researchers (Fudge et al., 1999), and is applicable to practice (Sanchez et al., 2000).
Further, expectancy theory enables a multidimensional diagnostic approach to motivation
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(Sanchez et al., 2000; Ilgen et al., 1981; Courtney et al., 1983; DeSanctis, 1983).
Expectancy theory explains motivation as a result o f a multi-level assessment (Galbraith
et al., 1967) including “perceptions o f the environment and expectations based on these
perceptions” (Brouer et al., 2011, p. 870). Expectancy theory shares the higher-order vs.
lower-order outcome orientation espoused by many behavioral theorists (e.g. Carver et
al., 1982; Wiener, 1948). First-order outcomes are the behaviors resulting from effort,
while second-order outcomes are the ultimate outcomes resulting from the behavior
(Sanchez et al., 2000). Specifically, expectancy theory— also referred to as VIE theory—
offers a set o f three motivational antecedents consisting o f ( 1 ) valence, (2 )
instrumentality, and (3) expectancy (Ellingson et al., 2011).

Valence
Valence is the preference o f one outcome over another (or all others) (Vroom,
1964). Valence is not the true satisfaction o f an outcome, but rather the anticipated
satisfaction (Vroom, 1964). This is an important distinction as valence serves as a
motivator toward future action in expectancy theory. Actual satisfaction contributes to
valence formulation only to the extent that past satisfaction influences future preferences
(Ellingson et al., 2011). Valence can also be described as an assessment o f the
attractiveness o f success (Feather, 1969).
In expectancy theory, valence is oriented toward higher-order outcomes (Sanchez
et al., 2000; Ellingson et al., 2011). For the purposes o f this study, security valence is
defined as an insider’s affinity for the protection o f his or her firm from information
security risks. The outcome referent o f security valence (i.e., the security o f the firm)
distinguishes it from behavioral attitudes (Taylor et al., 1995; Anderson et al., 2010;
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Ajzen, 1991). Security valence is associated with the attractiveness o f protecting the firm
(e.g. valence o f the higher-order goal) and not the attitude toward the protective behavior
itself (e.g. attitude about PMBs).Therefore, according to expectancy theory, it is the
security-related outcome and not the attractiveness o f the protective behavior itself which
motivates performance o f PMBs. In addition to valence perceptions, behavioral
motivation is also reliant upon assessments o f instrumentality and expectancy.

Instrumentality and Expectancy
Concomitant with valence, expectancy theory posits a dual-level model o f
motivation consisting o f instrumentality and expectancy. Like valence, instrumentality is
oriented toward higher-order outcomes. Instrumentality is an individual’s perception that
successfully enacting a behavior will lead to an ultimate (i.e. second-order) outcome
(Vroom,

1964).

Vroom

(1964)

describes

instrumentality

an

“outcome-outcome

association.” Conversely, expectancy is an “action-outcome association” and is defined as
a perception that an individual’s efforts will lead to the intended behavior (Vroom, 1964).
Therefore, expectancy theory provides a distinction between first- and second-order
probabilities: ( 1 ) a first-order probability (e.g. expectancy) is the likelihood that given
appropriate effort, an action can be taken, and ( 2 ) a second-order probability (e.g.
instrumentality) is the likelihood that successfully taking an action will lead to a desired
ultimate outcome.
The distinction between instrumentality and expectancy is important and has
received considerable treatment in the behavioral literature. Bandura (1977) describes the
distinction.
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People can give up trying because they lack a sense o f efficacy in
achieving the required behavior, or they may be assured o f their
capabilities but give up trying because they expect their behavior to have
no effect on an unresponsive environment or to be consistently punished.
These two separable expectancy sources o f futility have quite different
antecedents and remedial implications. To alter efficacy-based futility
requires development o f competencies and expectations o f personal
effectiveness. By contrast, to change outcome-based futility necessitates
changes in prevailing environmental contingencies that restore the
instrumental value of the competencies that people already possess (pp.
204-205).

Expectancy theory explains that expectancy and instrumentality have unique
antecedents and consequences. The diagnostic nature o f expectancy theory (Sanchez et
al., 2000; Ilgen et al., 1981) makes it an attractive approach for establishing the
antecedents of PMBs. In this study, I define security instrumentality as the perception
that securing one’s work-related information will protect the organization from security
threats, and security expectancy as the perception that with ample effort one can protect
his or her work-related information. Security instrumentality and expectancy, combined
with valence, influence insiders’ motivation to and withdrawal from the performance o f
PMBs.

Motivation and Withdrawal
Expectancy theory is often examined in terms o f positive motivation (i.e.
motivation toward an outcome) (Sanchez et al., 2000; DeSanctis, 1983; Fudge et al.,
1999). However, facets o f expectancy theory can be linked to positive, negative, or
neutral perceptions (Vroom, 1964). Lack o f instrumentality, for example, is linked to
perceptions of helplessness (Dweck, 1975), wherein the helpless individual has no
expectation o f behavioral contingency (Diener et al., 1980; Abramson et al., 1978). In
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other words, individuals who perceive themselves to be helpless expect that their
actions— no matter how well performed— will not lead to the desired ultimate outcome
(Diener et al., 1980; Maier et al., 1976).
Perceptions o f expectancy provide task-related (i.e. first-order) motivation
(Ellingson et al., 2011). Individuals lacking expectancy may see themselves as unskilled
(Brouer et al., 2011), while those lacking instrumentality feel helpless due to some
insurmountable personal or environmental circumstances (Diener et al., 1980; Maier et
al., 1976). Therefore, expectancy is associated with motivation to attempt the task
motivated at the task-level (Vroom, 1964; Brouer et al., 2011). Individuals lacking
instrumentality, however, often feel helpless and psychologically distance themselves
from the uncontrollable situation through a process o f psychological withdrawal (Dweck,
1975).
Psychological withdrawal is the psychological equivalent o f physical withdrawal,
which can be either organizational-level psychological withdrawal or simply the
withdrawal “from participation in a prescribed role” (Hulin et al., 1985, p. 233).
Withdrawal can be the result o f a preference (Horn et al., 2012), a mechanism for
avoiding stress (Keaveney et al., 1993), or the result o f unfavorable expectancies (Carver
et al., 1982). For the purpose o f this research, security withdrawal is defined as the
psychological withdrawal from participation in security roles (e.g. PMBs). The role o f
security withdrawal has received considerably less attention in the security literature than
other antecedents to security behaviors. The general schema o f learned helplessness and
expectancy theory is depicted in Figure 2.1.
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Security Valence
'The Outcome is Good'

Security Instrumentality
'Behavior Leads to Outcome'

E

Motivation
(Withdrawal)
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"Effort Leads to Behavior1

Figure 2.1 Expectancy Theory Schema - VIE Model o f Security Motivation/Withdrawal

Security, Education, Training, and Awareness
Each component o f the VIE model o f security motivation/withdrawal provides
unique insight into insiders’ behavior. To the extent that valence, instrumentality, and
expectancies can be influenced by organizations, behavioral outcomes are likewise
influenced. As it relates to security, SETA programs are the mechanism by which
organizations inform users o f security threats, establish the responsibilities o f the
employees, and detail the consequences o f failing to comply (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub
et al., 1998). It follows that SETA programs should relate directly to the expectancy
measures. In this way, expectancy theory provides a diagnostic framework for the
positive impact o f SETA programs.
Prior research has largely described the role o f SETA programs in deterring
inappropriate behaviors within an organization (Lee et al., 2002). Serving this purpose,
organizations often employ SETA programs to provide individuals with a prescribed
response to a given security threat (Zafar et al., 2009; Siponen et al., 2010), as well as to
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persuade the user that a failure to comply is amply detrimental so as to deter security
lapses (Straub et al., 1998). Recently the relationship between SETA and deterrence has
been supported empirically (D'Arcy et al., 2009). However, a well-developed program
should not only provide training related to security policy compliance, but should also
maintain a program o f keeping users aware o f evolving security threats (Whitman, 2003).
Further, to the extent that SETA programs influence the expectancy dimensions (i.e.,
valence, instrumentality, expectancy), SETA may be shown to be an effective tool in
motivating insiders to protect their organizations’ information and information systems
by the performance o f PMBs. The role o f SETA on the expectancy dimensions is
examined in this research to evaluate the potential motivational efficacy o f SETA
programs.

P sych ological C apital

In addition to the direct impact o f expectancy dimensions on motivation and
withdrawal, expectancy theory is also related to malleable personal characteristics
(Luthans et al., 2010) which have been shown to be an important consideration for
security-related behavior (e.g. Myyry et al., 2009; Workman et al., 2008; Leach, 2003) .
One such conceptualization o f personal characteristics, PsyCap, has emerged out o f the
positive psychology movement (Luthans et al., 2007a). Positive psychology is “the study
o f the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning
o f people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 2005), and PsyCap is a construct o f
positive “psychological resource capabilities” which are open to development (Luthans et
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al., 2009). PsyCap is a higher-order construct composed o f distinct yet related core tenets
o f positive psychology of hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy (Luthans et al.,
2007b).
As a component o f positive psychology, PsyCap is uniquely applicable to the
present study because positive psychology has the optimal functioning o f the average
person as its subject (Seligman et al., 2000; Sheldon et al., 2001).

PsyCap has also

received broad acceptance in business research and beyond (Avey et al., 2009;
Walumbwa et al., 2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011). PsyCap has been linked
to a number o f positive personal and organizational outcomes such as jo b performance
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), low
turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), as well as increased citizenship and decreased
deviance (Avey et al., 2011). Finally, PsyCap has been shown to mediate important
relationships between perceptions o f organizational and behavioral environment and
actual behavior (Luthans et al., 2008).
PsyCap Hope can be defined as a “positive motivational state that is based on an
interactively derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b)
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a).
PsyCap Resilience “is characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face of
significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al.,
2002). Resilience can also be thought o f simply as “the positive psychological capacity to
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive
change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al.,
2007a). PsyCap Optimism is defined as that characteristic that is held by individuals who
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“expect things to go their way, and generally believe that good rather than bad things will
happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 1985). PsyCap Self-Efficacy is role-breadth self-efficacy
and is defined as “the employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources or courses o f action needed to successfully
execute a specific task within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p.

66

; Luthans et

al., 2007a).
PsyCap can be viewed through a resource lens (Luthans et al., 2007b; Hobfoll,
1989; Hobfoll, 2002). Hobfoll (1989) stipulates that individuals require resources to
function and will seek to gain available resources and when possible conserve
unnecessarily expended resources. Thus, the conservation o f resources entails two
components: the building up o f resources and the conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a
resource can be built at the facet level by micro-intervention or at the construct level by
macro-intervention such as a supportive climate (Luthans et al., 2008). Resources are
either “centrally valued in their own right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued
ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can also be viewed as adaptive in that not only does
PsyCap embody a positive psychological state, as a psychological construct it serves
meaningful ends. For instance, PsyCap has been shown to provide a necessary
psychological resource for psychological well-being (Culbertson et al., 2010).
Lastly, a distinguishing quality o f PsyCap-and perhaps one reason that it has been
so widely considered— is that it has been shown to be composed o f characteristics that
are state-like rather than trait-like. This distinction between state- and trait-like
characteristics is important as it differentiates those characteristics which are innate and
inflexible from those which are malleable and developable (Zuckerman, 1983; Fugate et
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al., 2012). Trainable characteristics are especially critical in a security context as they can
be developed within an organization to enhance organizational security. PsyCap has been
shown to be developable (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2006a; Peterson et al.,
2011

); therefore, any benefits to firm security which can be shown to be attributable to

PsyCap can be influenced by an organization through an investment in employees’
PsyCap. This ductile quality of PsyCap distinguishes it from other, more stable, traits like
“The Big Five” personality traits (Goldberg, 1990) and the higher order “Core SelfEvaluation” (Judge et al., 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). Peterson (2012) notes:
“People’s locus of control and self-esteem are things a manager probably
can’t change significantly within a few weeks. Psychological capital is
more malleable. W e’re not bom hopeful, resilient, optimistic, efficacious
people. We leam these things.”
The facets o f PsyC ap and established facet-level developm ent strategies
are sum m arized in T able 2.1.
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Table 2.1
Summary o f PsyCap Characteristics
PsyCap
Component
PsyCap
SelfEfficacy

PsyCap
Hope

PsyCap
Optimism

PsyCap
Resilience

Definition
“[T]he em ployee’s conviction or confidence
about his or her abilities to m obilize the
motivation, cognitive resources or courses o f
action needed to successfully execute a
specific task within a given context”
(Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66)
“[PJositive motivational state that is based on
an interactively derived sense o f successful
(a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b)
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder
et al., 1991, p. 287).
Characterizes individuals who “expect things
to go their way, and generally believe that
good rather than bad things w ill happen to
them.” (Scheier et al., 1985).
“[T]he positive psychological capacity to
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity,
uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive
change, progress and increased
responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702)

Micro-Development
•

Mastery experiences

•
•

M odeling and vicarious learning
Social persuasion

•

Physiological and psychological
arousal

•
•
•

Goal-setting
Participation
Contingency planning for alternative
pathways to attain goals

•
•

Leniency for the past
Appreciation for the present

•

Opportunity-seeking for the future

•

A sset-focused strategies such as
enhancing em ployability
• Risk-focused strategies such as
proactive avoidance o f adversity
• Process-focused strategies to
influence the interpretation o f
adverse events
Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et
al. (2007b).

P rotection -M otivated B ehaviors

PMBs are the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect (1)
organizationally relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in
which that information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from
information-security threats (Posey et al., 2013). PMBs are in-role and extra-role
behaviors that an insider may undertake which protect the firm’s information and
information systems (Posey et al., 2013). Posey et al.(2013) categorized PMBs into a
systematic-based taxonomy made up o f fourteen categories (see Table 2.2) for summary,
and Posey et al. (2013) for full discussion).
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T able 2.2

PMB Roles
Identified Cluster Number and Name
4. Appropriate data entry and management______________________________________
3. Policy-driven awareness and action__________________________________________
8 . Wireless installation_______________________________________________________
2 . Protection against unauthorized exposure_____________________________________
7. Verbal and electronic sensitive-information protection__________________________
9 . Widely applicable security etiquette__________________________________________
12. Account protection________________________________________________________
11. Co-worker reliance___________________ ____________________
13. Immediate reporting o f suspicious behavior__________________________________
1. Legitimate e-mail handling__________________________________________________
6. Secure software, e-mail, and Internet use______________________________________
5. Document conversion______________________________________________________
10. Distinctive security etiquette_______________________________________________
14. Equipment location and storage_____________________________________________
Table 2.2 from Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett. & Courtney, 2013___________________________________

As a general class o f behaviors, PMBs are robust to the varying security policies
that are inevitably found across organizations. For example, compliance with an explicit
security policy is clearly an in-role behavior, but the specific behaviors required for that
compliance vary across firms (Bulgurcu et al., 2010 ).

R esearch M odel and H ypoth eses

SETA programs are often employed in order to inform employees about the
various threats to the organization’s security as well as to train employees to recognize
threats and enact various security roles (D'Arcy et al., 2009 ; Straub et al., 1998 ; Lee et
al., 2002 ). Education, training, and awareness each relate to the motivational dimensions
espoused in expectancy theory. SETA is expected to increase an insider’s perception of
behavioral expectancy, outcome instrumentality, and outcome valence. That is, SETA is
expected to ( 1 ) enhance the perception that insider’s efforts will lead to successful
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performance o f the desired security behavior (security expectancy), ( 2 ) increase an
insider’s perception that the behavior will lead ultimately to the security o f the firm
(security instrumentality), and (3) influence insiders’ perceptions that protecting the firm
is good (security valence).
H I: SETA will be positively related to users ’ security valence.
H2: SETA will be positively related to users ’ security instrumentality.
H3: SETA will be positively related to users ’ security expectancy.
Security expectancies are first-order perceptions (Vroom, 1964; Galbraith et al.,
1967) and are hypothesized to be positively related to motivation to protect the firm,
deemed protection motivation. As explained in expectancy theory, the perception that
effort will lead to performance o f a behavior is directly linked to behavioral motivation.
On the other hand, instrumentality (or lack thereof) is a second-order perception and
relates to ultimate outcomes. Security instrumentality is an insider’s perception that their
protective behaviors will ultimately protect the firm. A lack o f instrumentality is linked to
helplessness and withdrawal from behavioral attempts (Dweck, 1975; Carver et al.,
1982). Therefore, perceptions o f expectancy and instrumentality each have a unique
impact on PMBs through increased protection motivation and decreased security
withdrawal.
Expectancy theory further explains that favorability o f an outcome or valence
provides a motivational stimulus as well. Therefore, positive security valence (i.e.
favorable perception o f protecting the firm from security threats) is expected to be
positively related to protection motivation. Conversely, security valence is expected to be
negatively related to security withdrawal. Vroom (1964, p. 15) notes, “ [a] positive (or
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approach) motive signifies that outcomes which are members o f the class have positive
valence, and a negative (or avoidance) motive signifies that outcomes in the class have
negative valence.”
H4: Security expectancy will be positively related to users ’protection motivation.
H5: Security instrumentality will be negatively related to security withdrawal.
H6: Security valence will be positively related to users’protection motivation.
H7: Security valence will be negatively related to security withdrawal.
PsyCap is composed o f psychological resource capabilities (Luthans et al., 2007b;
Luthans et al., 2009) and is directly related to individual’s perceptions o f expectancy and
instrumentality. Security expectancy and instrumentality are hypothesized to be
positively related to each o f the PsyCap characteristics in related, yet distinct ways. First,
expectancy is expected to have a positive impact on PsyCap self-efficacy, which is rolebreadth self-efficacy (Parker, 1998; Luthans et al., 2007b), by virtue o f the increased
confidence o f an insider that he or she can successfully enact instrumental security
behaviors. In a similar way, PsyCap hope and PsyCap optimism are expected to be
increased by expectancies and instrumentalities, as those with perceptions o f expectancy
and instrumentality will feel able to enact pathways instrumental to reaching goals
(PsyCap hope) and will be more likely to believe that positive security outcomes can be
achieved

(PsyCap

optimism).

Finally,

employees’

perceived

expectancy

and

instrumentality are hypothesized to be related to PsyCap resilience, as individuals who
see themselves as able to enact instrumental security behaviors will be more equipped to
adapt in the face o f security challenges and bounce back after failed attempts to enact
PMBs.
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H8: Security expectancy will be positively related to users ’ PsyCap.
H9: Security instrumentality will be positively related to users ’ PsyCap.
Whether viewing PsyCap as a psychological resource or simply a positive
psychological state, the previously established links between PsyCap and organizational
outcomes provide a basis for the relationship between PsyCap and protection motivation.
For example, PsyCap has been positively linked to an increase in both job performance
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a) as well as increased organizational commitment
and citizenship (Avey et al., 2011). As security continues to be adapted into
organizational strategy through security policy and otherwise, an increase in job
performance, which includes security policy compliance, will lead to an increase in
organizational security (Siponen et al., 2006; Herath et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
The positive impact o f job satisfaction, commitment, and citizenship are closely linked
and are supported by findings that individuals who are satisfied with their jobs are better
organizational citizens and can be expected to perform both in-role and extra-role
behaviors to support the organization (Bateman et al., 1983; Williams et al., 1991). The
performance o f protective behaviors is the focus o f this research and as such, it is
expected that PsyCap will increase protection motivation in part by virtue o f the
established relationships with increased job performance, satisfaction, commitment, and
citizenship.
II10: PsyCap will be positively related to protection motivation.
PsyCap, has also been shown to reduce unfavorable outcomes such as
absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), and cynicism and
deviance (Avey et al., 2011). Therefore, PsyCap’s reduction o f withdrawal-related
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outcomes is hypothesized to reduce the security-vulnerability created by security
omission through the reduction o f security withdrawal.
H I 1: PsyCap will be negatively related to security withdrawal.
In line with the theories o f planned behavior (TPB) and reasoned action (TRA)
(Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen et al., 1972) which contend that intentions often mediate important
relationships with behavior, protection motivation is conceptualized as the intention to
protect the organization. Therefore, protection motivation is hypothesized to lead to
PMBs.

Finally, security withdrawal is the withdrawal from security roles, and is

hypothesized to lead to an omission o f PMBs (see Figure 2.2).
H I 2: Protection Motivation will be positively related to PMBs.
H I 3: Security withdrawal will be negatively related to PMBs.

PM Bs

SETA

H3

Security
W ithdraw al
H5
First O rd sr F o rm ativs
F irst O rd sr R aflactiva
"! S s c o n d O rd sr R aflactiva

Figure 2.2 Research Model

Measurement Models
As shown in Figure 2.2, the research model utilizes three distinct latent model
structures: first-order reflective constructs, a first-order formative construct, and a
second-order reflective construct. Construct specification is a topic o f considerable
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interest in IS research, as the field seeks to employ second generation techniques with
both theoretical and statistical validity (Bagozzi, 2011; Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen et al.,
2011; Straub et al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2003). The ultimate goal o f all model specification
is to appropriately model theoretical relationships; therefore, the on-going discussion
regarding the theoretical justification and statistical validity is an important one (AguirreUrreta et al., 2012; Jarvis et al., 2012).
The various forms o f model specification are “derived from the fact that (a) a
first-order construct can have either formative or reflective indicators, and (b) those firstorder constructs can, themselves, be either formative or reflective indicators o f an
underlying second-order construct” (Jarvis et al., 2003). Constructs defined as first- and
second-order reflective appear most often in business research (Jarvis et al., 2003), and
specify that the indicators at each level “reflect” the latent variable (Straub et al., 2004;
Jarvis et al., 2012). All o f the constructs in this study were adapted from prior research
and retained the specification o f the published measures.

R esearch M eth od ology

The multi-dimensional research model was tested empirically using survey
research methodology. The instrumentation for the survey was developed based on a
thorough literature review. Where possible, the items were adapted from prior research.
All the items included in the final survey were subjected to subject matter expert review
and were pilot tested before executing the final survey.

Study Measures
SETA was measured using five items in this study. SETA measures an individual’s
perception that the organization provides training to educate employees about
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information security issues and security responsibilities. As in previous research, SETA
was measured with a formative construct consisting o f five items (D'Arcy et al., 2009).
Security valence, instrumentality, and expectancy (VIE) measures were adapted
from existing scales o f the expectancy dimensions (Sanchez et al., 2000). The original
items measured VIE in a test-taking situation. In order to adapt the measures into a
security context, the measures were altered to capture the perception o f security-related
valence, instrumentality, and expectancy. The items adapted to measure security valence,
ascertain the extent to which the respondent perceives keeping the organization safe from
security threats is attractive or good. The items for security instrumentality were adapted
to reflect the perception that security their work-related information would secure the
organization from information security threats. Finally, security expectancy items were
adapted to measure the perception that with adequate effort the respondent could secure
his or her information at work. An example o f an item used to measure security valence
is “It would be good to protect my organization from security threats.” An example o f an
item used to measure security instrumentality is “If I protect my information and
computer at work, my organization has a good chance o f being protected from security
threats.” An example o f an item used to measure security expectancy is “I can protect my
information and computer at work if I put some effort into it.”
PsyCap was measured using the questionnaire developed by Luthans, Youssef et
al. (2007b). The PsyCap Questionnaire includes twenty-four items (six for each o f the
four characteristics). The PsyCap items were all developed from prior literature and have
consistently exhibited validity and test/retest reliability throughout the business literature.
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b).
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PsyCap hope measures state-hope and is “responsive to events in the lives o f
people” (Snyder et al., 1996, p. 321). PsyCap hope captures both the agency and pathway
components o f hope, and an example o f an item measuring PsyCap Hope is “I can think
of many ways to reach my current work goals”(Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap Resilience
measures an individual’s ability to bounce back or to take stressful things at work in
stride (Wagnild et al., 1993). An example o f an item measuring resilience is “I usually
take stressful things at work in stride” (Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap optimism measures
an individual’s state-belief that “good rather than bad things will happen to them”
(Scheier et al., 1985, p. 219). An example o f an item measuring PsyCap optimism is “I
approach this job as if ‘every cloud has a silver lining’”(Luthans et al., 2007b). Lastly,
PsyCap self-efficacy measures the state-like role-breadth self-efficacy and is based on
Parker’s (1998) self-efficacy scale. An example o f an item measuring PsyCap selfefficacy is “I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a solution” (Luthans et
al., 2007b).
Protection motivation was measured as an intention to perform protective
behaviors. The scale was developed in accordance with the view o f Ajzen and Fishbein
(1972) that intention mediates important antecedents o f behavior. As such, protection
motivation is modeled as a behavioral intention in the way o f the theory o f planned
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Posey (2010) developed a four item scale which was used to
assess an individual’s protection motivation. A sample item measuring protection
motivation is “I intend to protect my organization from its information security threats.”
Security withdrawal is a state o f psychological withdrawal in which individuals’
experience withdrawal-like symptoms such as denying, ignoring, or refusing to respond
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to security threats (Keaveney et al., 1993). The items used to measure security
withdrawal were adapted to reflect a psychological withdrawal from security from
established measures o f psychological distancing (Beaudry et al., 2010). Psychological
distancing is “the effort one expends to direct one’s attention away from the situation and
detach oneself from it” (Beaudry et al., 2010, p. 699). In order to assess security
withdrawal, insiders were asked to indicate the extent to which they engaged in
psychological distancing when dealing with a security threat. An example o f an item
measuring security withdrawal is “When confronted with a security threat...

I told

myself that there was nothing I could do about the threat to my organization’s
information security.”
PMBs were measured with a five-item scale developed based on a taxonomy o f
protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013). The taxonomy identifies fourteen
categories o f behaviors and reflective items measuring a general class o f PMBs were
developed using a MIMIC model (see Posey, in press for full explanation o f item
development). An item assessing the performance o f PMBs is “I tried to safeguard my
organization’s information and information systems from their information security
threats.”

A n alysis and R esults

The research model was analyzed in a two-step procedure as recommended by
methodologists (Gerbing et al., 1988). The analysis utilized covariance-based structural
equation modeling (SEM) platform Mplus (Muthen et al., 1998-2010). In the first step, a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run in Mplus in order to establish the validity of
the measures to be included in the subsequent structural model. Upon confirmation o f the
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validity o f the research model, the hypothesized research model was assessed using SEM
in Mplus. Prior to the collection o f the data for the final analysis, the instrument was pilot
tested to confirm the validity of the measures.

Pilot Study
Critical to any study is the validity and reliability o f the measures employed
(Straub, 1989; Gefen et al., 2011). As recommended, whenever possible the scales
included in this study were employed as previously published (Straub et al., 2004). The
instrument was pilot tested with a sample o f 42 MBA students from a large public
university in the Southeastern United States. All the students used for the pilot were
either currently employed or had previous work experience. The descriptive statistics o f
the pilot sample are summarized in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3
Descriptive Statistics o f Pilot Sample
Average Age
Average Organizational Tenure
Gender
Female
Male
IT Position
Management

24.26
1.66
31%
69%
4.8%
12.2%

The data from the pilot test was used to examine the validity o f the reflective
measures to be used in the study. The pilot test construct statistics were ascertained using
partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in SmartPLS (Ringle et al.,
2005). Overall, the results of the pilot test provide evidence o f the initial validity o f the
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measures to be used in the full study. The construct loadings from the pilot test are
summarized in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4
Pilot Study Construct Loadings
Security Security
Security Security
Expectancy Instrumentality Valence Withdrawal
0.932
0.934
0.865

SE1
SE2
SE3
SI1
SI2
SI3
SI4
SV1
SV2
SV3
SW1
SW2
SW3
PM1
PM2
PM3
PM4
PMB1
PMB2
PMB3
PMB4
PMB5
PCO
PCSE
PCH
PCR

Protection
Motivation

PMBs PsyCap

0.931
0.856
0.904
0.922
0.936
0.931
0.975
0.634
0.915
0.875
0.931
0.915
0.916
0.892
0.949
0.926
0.946
0.874
0.941
0.808
0.896
0.914
0.925

In addition to viewing the standardized loadings, I also examined the convergent
and divergent validity o f the constructs by calculating the latent variable correlations, the
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Cronbach’s alpha, and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each o f the constructs.
The convergent and divergent statistics are summarized in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5
Pilot Study Construct Correlations
Security
Expectancy
(SE)

Security
Instrumentality
(SI)

Security
Valence
(SV )

Security
Withdrawal
(SW )

Protection
Motivation
(PM )

PMB

PsyCap

Cronbach’s
a
0.8971

SE

0.83*

SI

0.6017

0.82

SV

0.3122

0.4366

0.90

SW

-0.4662

-0.6665

-0.4345

0.67

PM

0.7789

0.6611

0.5314

-0.6334

0.83

PM
B

0.4279

0.6104

-0.4493

0.6104

0.86

Psy
Cap

0.4578

0.4595

-0.1913

0.4595

0.3871

0.9247
0.9429
0.7557
0.9337
0.9593

0.4837
0.79

0.9189

0.434

*A V E ’s bolded along diagonal

Primary Study
After analyzing the results o f the pilot test and confirming the initial validity o f
the instrumentation, responses were collected from a sample o f 414 organizational
insiders. On-line panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they
offer full anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security
responses, anonymity is required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide
increased anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity o f
the respondents, and the privacy o f respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data
provider. Second, respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having
access to the survey outside o f their organization’s network and computers. Providing
anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and
appropriate for the elicitation o f self-reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially
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undesirable behaviors such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and
organizational deviance (Bennett et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003).

The descriptive

statistics o f the primary sample are summarized in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6
Descriptive Statistics o f Primary Sample
Average Age
Average Organizational Tenure

45.59
10.58

Gender

Female

Education

Male
Some high school
High school diploma

53.1%
46.9%
0.2%
11.4%

Some college
Undergraduate degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate/Professional degree

25.6%
41.5%
16.4%
4.8%

IT Position
Management

15.2%
33.8%

Construct Validity
For the reflective measures included in the structural model, the standardized
factor loadings from a CFA analysis were considered along with the Cronbach’s alphas.
Also, the convergent and discriminant validity o f measures in the structural model were
assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and the Fomell-Larker criterion
(comparison o f squared correlations with AVEs) as recommended (Hair et al., 2006; Hair
et al., 2014). This study also employed one construct which was specified as formative in
prior research, SETA (D'Arcy et al., 2009). The validity o f formative measures is
assessed differently than that o f reflective measures (Hair et al., 2014). In order to assess
the validity o f SETA, first, the content validly was examined for the present study.
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Second, the collinearity o f the formative items was assessed by calculating the indicator
correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF) o f each indicator. Finally, the
statistical and practical significance o f each formative indicator was assessed through the
significance and magnitude o f the coefficient (see Table 2.7).

Table 2.7
Full Measures in Study & Validity Statistics
CFA o f F .eflective Item s: C hi-Squared = 1758.36 d.f. =
Measures
Items
Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of
Security agreement with the following statements about
Valence information-security threats to your
organization.”
(SV)
I would like to protect my organization from
SV-1
information security threats.
It would be good to protect my organization
from information security threats.
SV-2
I want to protect my organization from
SV-3
information security threats.
Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of
Security agreement with the following statements about
Expectancy information-security threats to your
organization.”
(SE)
If 1 try my best to perform security tasks, I can
successfully
protect
my
work-related
SE-1
information.
If I concentrate and try hard then I can secure
SE-2
my work-related information.

794; C F I: 0.9^1; RM SEA: 0.054
Scale1 Spec." Mean STD Load.

Spec.

a

R

5.89

1.230 0.970

a

R

6.02

1.191 0.894

a

R

5.94

1.202 0.945

Scale

Spec.

Mean

STD Load.

a

R

5.44

1.225 0.908

a

R

5.32

1.208 0.887

R

5.49

1.210 0.911

I can protect my work-related information if I
put some effort into it.
a
Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000)
Security Instructions: “ Please indicate your level of
In stru  agreement with the following statements about
m entality information-security threats to your
Scale
organization.”
(SI)
If I protect my work-related information, my
organization has a good chance o f being
protected from security threats.
a
SI-1
SE-3

Mean STD Load.

Scale

Spec.

R

Mean STD Load.

5.30

1.361 0.941
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Table 2.7 (Continued)
I think my organization will be protected from
security threats if I can secure my work-related
SI-2
information.
a
How well I protect my work-related
information
will
affect
whether
my
organization is protected from security threats.
a
SI-3
The better I am at securing my work-related
information, the more likely my organization
SI-4
a
will be protected from security threats.
Adapted from Beaudry et al. (2010)
Instructions: “ Indicate how often you reacted in
Security the following ways when confronted with a
Withdrawa threat to your organization’s information
Scale
1(SW) security.”
“Indicate how often you reacted in the
following ways when confronted with a threat
to your organization's information security.”
b
I told m yself that time would take care o f the
threat to my organization's information
b
SW-I
security.
1 told m yself that there was nothing I could do
about the threat to my organization's
SW-2
information security.
b
I tried not to worry about the threat to my
SW-3
organization's information security.
b
Posey (2010)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of
Protection agreement with the following statements about
Motivation information-security threats to your
organization.”
Scale
(PM)
I intend to protect my organization from its
a
PM-1
information security threats.
My intentions to prevent my organization's
information security threats from being
a
PM-2
successful are high.
It is likely that I will engage in activities that
protect my organization's information and
PM-3
information systems from security threats.
a
1 intend to expend effort to protect my
organization from its information security
PM-4
threats.
a
PsyCap (Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of
Hope
(PCH) agreement with the following statements."
Scale
If I should find m yself in a jam at work, I could
think of many ways to get out o f it.
PCH-1
a

R

5.24

1.389 0.912

R

5.24

1.509 0.911

R

5.18

1.355 0.897

Spec.

Mean

STD Load.

R

2.95

1.673 0.715

R

3.08

1.638 0.856

R

3.87

1.637 0.652

R

Spec.

Mean STD Load.

R

5.48

1.314 0.931

R

5.36

1.355 0.892

R

5.28

1.424 0.863

R

5.23

1.369 0.864

Spec.

Mean

STD Load.

R

5.34

1.057 0.721
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Table 2.7 (Continued)
At the present time, I am energetically pursuing
my work goals.
a
Right now I see myself as being pretty
PCH-4 successful at work.
a
1 can think o f many ways to reach my current
a
PCH-5 work goals.
At this time, 1 am meeting the work goals that I
a
PCH-6 set for myself.
PsyC ap (Luthans et al., 2007b)
Resilience Instructions: "'Please indicate your level of
Scale
agreement with the following statements."
(PCR)
I usually manage difficulties one way or
PCR-2 another at work.
a
I can be “on my own,” so to speak, at work if I
a
PCR-3
have to.
PCR-4
I usually take stressful things at work in stride.
a
I can get through difficult times at work
a
PCR-5
because I’ve experienced difficulty before.
I feel 1 can handle many things at a time at this
a
PCR-6 job.
(Luthans
et
al.,
2007b)
PsyC ap
O ptim ism Instructions: "Please indicate your level o f
Scale
(PCO ) agreement with the following statements."
When things are uncertain for me at work, I
PCO-1
usually expect the best.
a
I always look on the bright side o f things
PCO-3
regarding my job.
a
I’m optimistic about what will happen to me in
PCO-4 the future as it pertains to work.
a
I approach this job as if “every cloud has a
PCO-6 silver lining.”
a
PsyCap
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
SelfInstructions: "Please indicate your level of
Efficacy
agreement with the following statements."
Scale
(PCSE)
I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem
PCSE-1 to find a solution.
a
I feel confident in representing my work area in
PCSE-2 meetings with management.
a
I feel confident contributing to discussions
PCSE-3 about the company’s strategy.
a
I feel confident helping to set targets/goals in
PCSE-4 my work area.
a
I feel confident contacting people outside the
company (e.g., suppliers, customers) to discuss
PCSE-5 problems.
a
PCH-2

R

5.14

1.334 0.675

R

5.41

1.054 0.764

R

5.29

1.246 0.794

R

5.45

1.118 0.763

Spec.

Mean

STD Load.

R

5.64

.989 0.814

R
R

6.01
5.18

1.069 0.714
1.202 0.668

R

5.61

1.069 0.850

R

5.65

1.111 0.786

Spec.

Mean

STD Load.

R

4.81

1.263 0.773

R

5.03

1.521 0.845

R

5.09

1.277 0.765

R

4.96

1.421 0.762

Spec.

Mean STD Load.

R

5.43

1.143 0.786

R

5.45

1.274 0.782

R

5.05

1.375 0.752

R

5.543 1.250 0.742

R

5.17

1.482 0.625
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Table 2.7 (Continued)

PCSE-6
Protection
M otivated
Behaviors
(PM B)

PMB-1

PMB-2

PMB-3

PMB-4

PMB-5
Security
Education
T rain in g
A w areness
(SETA)

SETA-1

SETA-3
SETA-4

SETA-5

I feel confident presenting information to a
a
group o f colleagues.
(Posey, 2010)
Instructions: “Given the following statements,
on what basis did you engage in the stated
behaviors in the last year?”
Scale
I actively attempted to protect my
organization’s information and computerized
information systems
b
I tried to safeguard my organization’s
information and information systems from their
information security threats
b
I took committed action to prevent information
security threats to my firm’s information and
computer systems from being successful
b
I purposefully defended my organization from
information security threats to its information
and computerized information systems
b
I earnestly attempted to keep my organization’s
information and computer systems from harm
produced by information security threats
b
D’Arcy et al. (2009)
Instructions: “Please indicate your level o f
agreement with the following statements about
your organization.”
Scale
My organization provides training to help
employees improve their awareness o f
computer and information security issues.
a
In my organization, employees are briefed on
the consequences of modifying computerized
data in an unauthorized way.
a
My organization educates employees on their
computer security responsibilities.
a
In my organization, employees are briefed on
the consequences o f accessing computer
systems that they are not authorized to use.
a

(R) = reverse scored item
'Scale:
a) Strongly Disagree - Strongly Agree;
"Specification:
R) reflective F) formative

R

Spec.

5.32

1.347 0.755

Mean STD Load.

R

4.87

1.900 0.944

R

4.94

1.877 0.906

R

4.52

1.983 0.863

R

4.36

1.994 0.813

R

4.90

1.886 0.924

Spec.

Mean STD Load.

F

4.51

1.846 0.081

F

4.50

1.870 0.112

F

4.82

1.795 0.529

F

4.59

1.854 0.349

b) N e v e r- Always

As shown in Table 2.7, most o f the standardized loadings o f the reflective items
were above a conservative 0.70 cutoff criterion. A loading o f 0.70 indicates that the
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associated latent variable accounts for 50% o f the variance in the indicator (Hair et al.,
2006; Hair et al., 2014). The Cronbach’s alpha o f each construct was within the
recommendations o f prior research (Nunnally, 1978) (see Table 2.8). Finally, the
constructs exhibit convergence and discriminance as indicated by the ratio o f FomellLarker statistic and latent variable correlations o f < 1.

Table 2.8
Primary Study Reflective Construct Correlations
Security
Security
Expectancy Instrumentality
(SE)
(SI)

SE
SI
SV
SW
PM
PM
B
Psy
Cap

Security
Valence
(SV)

Security
Withdrawal
(SW)

Protection
Motivation
(PM)

PsyCa Cronbach’s
PMB

P

a
0.93
0.95
0.96
0.78
0.94
0.96

0.71

0.95

0.81*

0.78
0.69
-0.19
0.79
0.59

0.84

0.64
-0.17
0.79

0.88
0.56

-0.25
0.75
0.56

-0.18
-0.04

0.75

0.79

0.56

-0.15

0.46

0.39

0.79

0 .6 6

0.63
0.53

*AVE’s bolded a ong diagonal

The validity o f SETA was assessed according to the recommendations for
formatively specified constructs (Hair et al., 2014). First, the content validity o f the
SETA measure was established. Formative measures are modeled to include no measure
error (Bagozzi, 2011); therefore, the formative items are said to fully explain the latent
variable. An error in content validity is manifest in the absence o f an item which should
be included in order to fully represent the construct domain. The formative item
measuring SETA was taken directly from prior research (D'Arcy et al., 2009). In its prior
use, SETA was validated in a similar context (security) and to a similar population
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(organizational insiders). Based on the previous establishment o f SETA and an
assessment of the items forming SETA, the construct was determined to be content valid.
Second, the collinearity o f the items was assessed by assessing the correlations among
items and running regressions o f each item on the others in order to ascertain the VIF
level o f each item. Items with a VIF o f greater than ten are said to suffer from
multicollinearity, while those with a VIF o f five or less are conservatively assessed to
have no multicollinearity (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2014; Hair et al., 2006). The
range o f VIFs was 3.0 to 4.3 with the average for each SETA item reported in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9
SETA Item Correlations & VIFs
SE T A 1

SETA
SETA
SETA
SETA

1
3
4
5

3.7
.786***
7 9 4 ***

SE T A 3

3.4
76i***
3 3 9 ***

SE T A 4

3.7
793***
.801***
*** p= 0 .0 C)1; avg. VIF. bolded along diagonal

SE T A 5

3.2

Structural Model
Finally, the hypothesized relationships in the research model were tested using
SEM. The Chi-Squared statistic and degrees o f freedom (X2=2552.8 and d.f.=967; X 2 to
d.f. ratio = 2.6) along with a goodness o f fit index (CFI =0.90) and a badness o f fit index
(RMSEA=.06) all indicate that the final structural model has good fit overall (Hu et al.,
1999; Kline, 2010). Moreover, nine o f thirteen hypothesized relationships were
significant and in the predicted direction. ( see Table 2.10)
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Table 2.10
Structural Model Results
Chi-Squared = 2552.8; d.f.= 967
CFI=0.91; RMSEA=0.06
Hyp.
HI
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
HI
0
HI
1
HI
2

Hypothesis
(direction)

Path
Significance
Coefficient p-value (two-tailed)
0.520
<0.001 ***

SETA-> Security expectancy (+)
SETA-> Security valence (+)
SETA-^ Security instrumentality (+)
Security expectancy
Protection motivation (+)
Security instrumentality -> Security withdrawal (-)
Security valence -> Protection motivation (+)
Security valence
Security withdrawal (-)
Security expectancy -> PsyCap (+)
Security instrumentality -> PsyCap (+)
PsyCap -> Protection motivation (+)

0.403
0.514
0.572
-0.002
0.453
-0.242
0.572
0.139
0.020

<0.001 k k k
<0.001 k k k
<0.001 k k k
0.983 n/s
<0.001 ■ki ck
0.001 k k k
<0.001 k k k
0.044 k
0.668
n/s

PsyCap

-0.015

0.827

0.734

<0.001

Security withdrawal (-)

Protection motivation

PMBs (+)

HI
Security withdrawal -> PMBs (-)
0.11
0.009
3
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s^not significant

n/s
k kk

kk

Controls and Rival Explanations
To substantiate the findings o f the structural model, the analysis was performed
again including several controls. As can be seen in Table 2.11, controls for age, tenure,
gender, and whether the individual had a managerial or an IT position had no significant
impact on the performance o f PMBs. Additionally, potential rival explanations o f PMBs
were tested in order to isolate the impact o f the expectancy model. Security locus o f
control, managerial support for security, and social desirability were all included as
potential rival explanations o f the performance o f PMBs. Again, as can be seen in Table
2.11, none o f the controls were statistically related to the performance o f PMBs. Further,
the expectancy model was fully robust to the inclusion o f the controls and the substantive
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variables in the study suffered no appreciable loss o f impact or significance when tested
in concert with a plethora o f controls. The research model is shown in Figure 2.3.

Table 2.11
Structural Model Results Including Controls
Chi-Squared = 4104.921; d.f.= 1660
CFI=0.87; RMSEA=0.06
Hyp Hypothesis
.
(direction)
HI
SETA-> Security expectancy (+)
H2
SETA-^ Security valence (+)
SETA-^ Security instrumentality (+)
H3
Security expectancy
Protection motivation (+)
H4
Security instrumentality
Security withdrawal (-)
H5
Security valence
Protection motivation (+)
H6
H7
Security valence 4 Security withdrawal (-)
Security expectancy -> PsyCap (+)
H8
H9
Security instrumentality
PsyCap (+)
H10 PsyCap -> Protection motivation (+)
HI 1 PsyCap
Security withdrawal (-)
H12 Protection motivation
PMBs (+)

Path
Coefficient
0.520
0.403
0.514
0.573
-0.003
0.454
-0.240
0.553
0.139
0.017
-0.016
0.722
0.097

H13 Security withdrawal
PMBs (-)
Controls
0.004
Age
Tenure
-0.005
Manager
0.227
IT Position
0.147
Gender
-0.061
Security Locus o f Control
0.046
Managerial Support for Security
-0.083
Social Desirability
0.071
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant

p-value
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.964
<0.001
0.001
<0.001
0.045
0.718
0.816
<0.001
0.031
0.457
0.513
0.101
0.422
0.635
0.425
0.141
0.196

Significance
(two-tailed)
***
ftftft
***
ftftft
n/s
AAA
ftftft
&&ft
ft
n/s
n/s
ftftft
ft
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
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Figure 2.3 Research Model

D iscussion

The expectancy-based security model provides a robust, multidimensional
framework o f PMB motivation. The role o f insiders as protectors o f the firm’s security is
an evolving role that is based on the realization that insiders are uniquely able to protect
their firm’s information and information systems (Posey et al., 2013). The results o f this
study elucidate the impact o f expectancy dimensions on the motivation to and withdrawal
from performance of security behaviors. As predicted, security expectancy is positively
related to the motivation to protect the firm’s information and IS. Additionally, security
valence is positively related to protection motivation and negatively related to security
withdrawal.
In addition to finding support for relationships espoused in Vroom’s (1964)
expectancy theory, I also found support for the role o f SETA in influencing insiders’
security-related valence, instrumentality, and expectancies. The positive impact o f
training was shown through the relationship between SETA and all three expectancy
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measures. Second, as hypothesized, expectancy and instrumentality build insiders’
psychological resource capabilities manifested in their positive relationship with PsyCap.
Finally, as predicted protection motivation is positively related to PMBs. Therefore, the
intention to protect the firm from security threats significantly impacts whether or not an
insider proactively attempts to protect their firm’s information and information system.
The direct role o f PsyCap on security motivation was not supported in the
research model. PsyCap was not significantly related to either motivation or withdrawal.
However, the findings support a relationship between security and PsyCap. Specifically,
the expectancy theory measures were shown to increase the PsyCap o f individuals. One
potential explanation o f the insignificant relationship between PsyCap and protection
motivation is the substantial explanatory power o f the security expectancy measures,
which leave little variance in protection motivation for PsyCap to explain.
I found one significant relationship which was in the opposite direction o f the
hypothesis, the relationship between security withdrawal and PMBs. This finding is
seemingly counter-intuitive at first given the concept o f security withdrawal. However,
security withdrawal as measured in self-report requires that the individual actively
identify potential security threats and then cope with the threat by psychologically
distancing him or herself from the performance o f security behaviors. This identification
o f security threats may be confounding the impact o f security withdrawal by implicitly
including an identification o f potential security threats. The significant negative
relationship between security valence and withdrawal supports this assertion by
indicating that individuals who believe it is good to protect their firm from security
threats are less likely to withdraw psychologically from security behaviors. In this way,
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the nuance o f psychological withdrawal is made evident as psychological withdrawal
does not necessarily negatively relate to intention to protect the firm. Ergo, an individual
may not be convinced that protecting the firm is good, and may withdraw psychologically
from security behaviors yet refrain from malicious intent or maintain an— albeit
weaker— intention to protect the firm.

Implications and Contributions
This research makes several important contributions to the behavioral information
security literature. First, the expectancy theory-based research model establishes evidence
o f SETA’s positive relationship with insiders’ expectancies. The positive relationship
between SETA and each of the expectancy dimensions provides an important framework
for the influence o f SETA on insiders’ motivation to and withdrawal from protective
behaviors. The diagnostic nature o f expectancy theory makes it uniquely suited for
establishing training roles, and the significance o f SETA on expectancy, instrumentality,
and

valance

support

a

multi-dimensional

framework

for

SETA

development.

Organizations seeking to increase security can effectively develop insiders’ behavioral
expectancies, outcome instrumentalities, and outcome valences via SETA programs.
Complementary to the recently established deterring effect o f SETA (D'Arcy et
al., 2009), this research also provides support for a broad and positive impact o f SETA
programs. In addition to the direct relationship between SETA and expectancy measures,
the findings establish an indirect relationship between SETA and PsyCap. Therefore,
organizations which employ SETA programs to impact the valence, instrumentality and

50
expectancies o f insiders will have the compounding organizational impact o f insiders’
increased PsyCap which has been found to be related to myriad positive organizational
outcomes (see Table 2.12).

Table 2.12
Summary o f Key Findings

Key finding

Significance to research

Significance to practice

SETA’s influence on the
three expectancy
dimensions

Provides a diagnostic
framework for future
research on SETA
effectiveness.

Expectancy dimensions
influence on insiders’
PsyCap

Provides evidence o f the
broadly positive impact o f
SETA through the
development o f expectancy
dimensions.

Expectancy dimensions
influence on motivation
to/withdrawal from
security behaviors

Provides behavioral
information security
research with a framework
within which to investigate
insiders’ motivation to and
withdrawal from security
behaviors.
Isolates the results o f the
research model to the
expectancy dimensions
which are shown to be
malleable through SETA.

Provides support for SETA
as an effective mechanism
for developing the
expectancy facets o f
insiders.
Links security to positive
psychological resources,
and provides a framework
o f PsyCap development for
organizations through
SETA programs.
Provides a framework for
SETA in which training for
the expectancy dimensions
increases insiders’
motivation to protect the
firm.

Expectancy Theory model
robust to controls for
( 1 ) demographics
(2 ) managerial support,
(3) social desirability, and
(4) locus o f control

Provides support for the
robustness o f
organizational security
programs which
incorporate manipulation
o f expectancy dimensions.

The multi-dimensional expectancy-based approach to security is also an effective
model o f PMBs, accounting for 53% o f the variance in PMBs. Further, security valence
and security expectancy together explained
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% o f the variance in insider’s protection

motivation. This indicates that organizations that are able to successfully affect insiders’
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security expectancy and valence can make a substantial impact in influencing the
protection motivation o f their employees. These relationships are important for the
development o f future organizational initiatives and SETA programs. The impact o f
SETA was significant and similar on all three measures in the VIE model, indicating that
to a large extent SETA programs equally influence each facet o f expectancy.

Limitations and Future Research
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence o f observational data of
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the
behavior o f insiders. I took recommended precautions to ensure that individual
anonym ity w as preserved and responses w ere uninhibited. A dditionally, the data

analyzed in this research was collected at a cross-sectional level with differences
measured between randomly surveyed organizational insiders. Expectancy theory has
been employed at both the within and between individual levels in past research. While
some have argued that expectancy theory is most appropriate for analyzing motivational
changes within individuals, the robust performance o f expectancy between individuals
supports its use as a framework o f security behavior across individuals. Given the
significance o f the research model, future research can use this expectancy-based
framework to examine within individual impacts resulting from manipulations such as
training sessions.
In the research model, SETA significantly explained 26%, 27%, and 16% o f the
variance in instrumentality, expectancy, and valence, respectively. This underscores the
remaining antecedents to expectancy measures to be uncovered by future research. A
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significant relationship between the expectancy theory measures o f instrumentality and
expectancy and PsyCap was established in this research. However, PsyCap was not
significantly related to either protection motivation or to security withdrawal. Future
research should continue to examine the relationship between insiders’ PsyCap and
security behaviors. Specifically, the role o f PsyCap as a resource for security behavior, as
a potential moderator o f important relationships, and as a dependent variable in IS
research should be explored.

Conclusion
This chapter developed and applied an expectancy theory based research model of
protective security behaviors. The results o f the study indicate that expectancy theory is
an appropriate framework within which to view the performance o f PMBs. Nine o f the
thirteen hypothesized relationships were significant and in the hypothesized direction.
Security expectancies build insiders’ PsyCap and also provide motivation to protect the
firm. Security valence buffers insider’s from withdrawing from security behaviors and
simultaneously motivates toward protection o f the firm. Security instrumentality also
works to build insiders’ PsyCap. The positive impact o f SETA was also made clear in the
results o f the structural model, being significantly related to the three facets o f the
expectancy model (VIE). The indirect effect o f SETA on PsyCap is an important finding
and underscores the broadly positive impact o f security training. Finally, the results were
robust to a number o f important controls, both demographic related, personality related,
and security related.

CHAPTER 3

THE ADAPTIVE ROLE OF EMOTION IN
INFORMATION SECURITY: BROADENING
THE THEORETICAL REPERTOIRE

Introduction
Humans are broadly influenced by experiences o f emotion. An individual’s
emotional reaction is often an adaptational intermediary between stimuli

and

corresponding behavior (Lazarus, 1991). In information systems (IS), emotive-behavioral
models have provided a complementary view o f adaptation to the plethora o f cognitivebehavioral models (e.g. Venkatesh et al., 2003; Davis, 1989). Behavioral models are of
increasing interest in IS security as practitioners and researchers recognize that the
information security o f organizations is at the mercy o f organizational insiders (Moore et
al., 2008; Boss et al., 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2007). Organizational insiders include not only
technology specialists, but all employees and organizational agents with access to the
information system and informational resources in the fulfillment o f organizational
responsibilities (Posey et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 1998). In today’s environment o f
enterprise-wide systems and ubiquitous computing, these insiders have the greatest
access to their organization’s information and IS (Stanton et al., 2006a). For example,
over 50% o f firms worldwide now allow employees to use mobile devices for tasks such
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as sales force automation, project management, and email (Symantec, 2012). Another
89% o f firms have enabled employees to access organizationally relevant material from
employee-owned devices, a phenomenon dubbed “bring your own device” (BYOD)
(Bradley et al., 2012).
Given the influence o f insiders’ behavior on security and the central role of
emotion in adaptation, the study o f emotion in IS security is warranted. Further, all
organizations are emotionally-laden (Amabile et al., 2005). Emotion in the workplace,
however, is not merely an artifact o f the organization itself, but rather a manifestation o f
the multitudes o f person-environment relationships which constitute the larger
organization (Lazarus, 1991). Lazarus (1991 loc. 570) notes, “the basic unit o f this
person-environment relationship is an adaptational encounter.” IS security is rife with
such adaptational encounters as insiders are assailed with increasingly sophisticated
threats to their firms’ security (Hamill et al., 2005). IS security has no framework for the
consideration o f the broad spectrum o f emotions, but rather—as in the broader
organizational literature (Fredrickson, 1998)— has often considered only the role o f
negative emotions, particularly fear (e.g. Johnston et al., 2010).

However, emotional

stimuli often elicit multiple emotions o f varying intensities simultaneously (Lazarus et
al., 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Beaudry et al., 2010).

The broaden-and-build theory

(Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001) provides a multi-dimensional framework o f
emotions which includes the often neglected positive emotions. The broaden-and-build
theory posits that positive emotions “broaden the scope o f attention and thought-action
repertoires,”

(Fredrickson

et

al.,

2005)

while

simultaneously

building

lasting

psychological resources (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2005).
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An individual’s thought-action repertoire is the collection o f the thoughts and behaviors,
which are cognitively available to the actor (Fredrickson et al., 2005).
The broaden and build theory is an outworking o f a new positive direction in the
larger field o f psychology known as the positive psychology movement (Seligman et al.,
2000). Positive psychology is “the study o f the conditions and processes that contribute to
the flourishing or optimal functioning o f people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al.,
2005). Positive psychological resources such as those described in the broaden-and-build
theory

have

received

increased

attention

in

positive

psychology.

One

such

conceptualization o f positive psychological resources is psychological capital (PsyCap).
PsyCap is a construct o f positive “psychological resource capabilities” which are open to
development (Luthans et al., 2009). PsyCap is a higher order construct composed of
distinct yet related core tenets o f positive psychology o f hope, resilience, optimism, and
self-efficacy (Luthans et al., 2007b).
PsyCap is uniquely applicable in behavioral information security research because
the optimal functioning o f the “average person” is its subject (Sheldon et al., 2001).
Similarly, IS security research has taken an interest in the role o f ordinary insiders,
including their ability to increase their firms’ information security (Posey et al., 2013;
Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005). Recently, a taxonomy o f protectionmotivated behaviors (PMBs) has explicated the ways in which these ordinary insiders can
protect their organizations’ information and IS (Posey et al., 2013). PMBs are the
volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect ( 1 ) organizationally
relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that
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information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from informationsecurity threats (Posey et al., 2013).
Whether through security policy compliance (Herath et al., 2009) or PMBs (Posey
et al., 2013), insiders seeking to practice safe computing are faced with an increasingly
complex environment within which to protect the organization’s IS. Organizations often
play on the emotions o f employees to elicit security behaviors by employing appeals to
emotion, such as fear (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2010; Herath et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2009). However, as the role o f emotion continues to become increasingly
important in IS, a thorough treatment o f the role o f emotion requires the spectrum of
emotions be considered (Beaudry et al., 2010). The broaden-and-build theory provides a
model for considering the role o f emotions, both positive and negative in adaptation. The
goal o f this paper is to integrate a framework o f emotions (Beaudry et al., 2010) with the
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) to thoroughly examine the adaptive
role o f emotions in information security.

Emotion and Adaptation in IS
It is inconceivable to me that there could be an approach to the mind, or
to human and animal adaptation, in which the emotions are not a key
component. Failure to give emotion a central role puts theoretical and
research psychology out o f step with human preoccupations from the
beginning o f recorded time (Lazarus, 1991 loc. 125-127).
IS research continues to adapt to the evolving role o f technology in the workplace
and society at large. Along this pursuit, Abraham et al. (2013) describe the need to add
adaptive mechanisms to the “theoretical repertoire” o f IS research. A principle tenet o f
adaptation is the belief that the most suited creatures survive (i.e. “survival o f the
fittest”).The organizational and economic implications o f survival o f the fittest are
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widespread from firm survival (Gimeno et al., 1997) to the adoption o f technology
(Hantula et al., 2011; Kock, 2009). From an evolutionary perspective, emotions play the
adaptive role o f fit enhancement (Nesse et al., 2009). Hence, when fit is challenged,
negative emotions are positively adaptive and vice versa. It has been the role o f emotions
to elicit some innate or adaptive response which generally has increased the survival o f
our species (Nesse et al., 2009). Therefore, emotions can be viewed as either an innate
coping mechanism or an evolved remnant o f historically (and presently) adaptive
responses.
Behavioral research has begun to acknowledge the role o f adaptation in the
explanation o f behavioral responses (Capra et al., 2011; Griskevicius et al., 2011; Hantula
et al., 2011). However, a general framework for describing phenomena in light of
adaptive responses has not yet been created (Saad, 2011). The broaden-and-build theory
o f positive emotions offers an integrated framework o f emotions. Application o f the
broaden-and-build theory provides explanation o f the complex relationship between
emotional stimuli and adaptation. Additionally, the broaden-and-build theory elucidates
the role o f emotions (both positive and negative) on cognition, behavior, and the
psychological resources o f the emotional being.

Affect and Emotion in IS Security
Since William James (1884) first asked What is an emotion?, and even long
before, philosophers, psychologists, and other behaviorists have grappled with the
meaning and implications of emotions (Solomon, 2008). Even now there remain
inconsistencies in the conception o f emotions in contrast to other affective states, such as
sensory pleasure and positive mood (Fredrickson et al., 2008). For many (including the
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author), an acceptable differentiator is that emotions, both negative and positive, have a
specific referent (Beaudry et al., 2010; Lazarus, 1991; Smith et al., 1990). This is in the
vein o f what Frijda (1988) called “situational meaning.” Therefore, affect can be viewed
as an “umbrella for a set o f more specific mental processes including emotions, moods,
and (possibly) attitudes,” and emotion a referent specific “mental state o f readiness”
(Bagozzi et al., 1999, p. 184).
Positive affect is often concomitant with positive emotion though more stable and
relatively long lasting (Fredrickson, 2001; Forgas et al., 2001). Further, as opposed to the
specificity o f emotions, positive affect is often considered a measure o f general happiness
(Culbertson et al., 2010). Both positive emotions and affect, however, facilitate
motivation or approach behavior (Carver et al., 1990; Cacioppo et al., 1999). The stable
nature o f general affect over time has caused it to become conceptualized as a trait-like
characteristic o f individuals (Kaplan et al., 2009). Persistent or trait-like affect is
associated with categories o f workplace behavior (Bennett et al., 2003). For example,
positive affect has been linked to organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), while a
negative affect has been linked to a decrease in OCBs along with an increase in
counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) (Kaplan et al., 2009).
Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010) developed a framework for classifying specific
emotions in IS based on the work o f Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus et al., 1984;
Folkman et al., 1986). Lazarus and Folkman (1984, p. 26) describe a coping process for
individuals confronted with “any event in which the person feels his or her adaptive
resources to be taxed or exceeded.” According to Lazarus, taxing stimuli initiate a two
stage appraisal process: (1) a primary appraisal and (2) a secondary appraisal (Lazarus et
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al., 1984). During the primary appraisal, an individual assesses the stimulus as either
irrelevant, benign-positive, or stressful, while the secondary appraisal is a judgment of
control. Stressful appraisals are further delineated as harm/loss, threat, or challenge
(Lazarus et al., 1984). These primary, secondary, and stress appraisals can be seen in the
emotional framework presented by Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010) (see Figure 3.1).

P rim ary / Appraisal
O p p o i •tu n ity

i

k

A chievem ent E m otions
—

E xam ples:

jj)
•J5

q_
^
[5

(/)

Happiness
satisfaction.
pleasure.
relief.
enjoyment

E xam ples:

P erceiv ed lack of
co nseq u en ces

L o ss E m otions
E xam ples:

O

C hallenge E m otions

Excitement,
hope.
anticipation.
arousal.
playfuless.
flow P erceiv ed control

A voidance Em otions*

Anger.
dissatisfaction.
disappointment.
afrnunstroaytio
edn.
disgust

E xam ples:

co n seq u en ces

Anxiety,
fear
worry
distress

i>

T h i -e

a t

♦Originally named “Deterrence Emotions"

Figure 3.1 Classification o f Emotions - Adaptedfrom Beaudry & Pinsonneault (2010)

Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) framework o f emotions is instrumental in the
depiction of discrete emotions as experiences o f emotions are often overlapping and
varying in intensity (Lazarus et al., 1984). The framework can also be viewed as
categorizing emotions as either positive (above the x-axis) or negative (below the x-axis).
The distinction o f positive and negative emotions is warranted as positive and negative
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emotions have been found to be relatively independent and impact behavior and
cognition differently (Bagozzi et al., 1999; Cenfetelli, 2004; Fredrickson, 2001). When
stimuli are appraised as fit enhancing (i.e. an opportunity), the emotions elicited have a
positive valence, whereas stimuli assessed as challenging fit (i.e. a threat) elicit negative
emotions

(Nesse et al., 2009; Beaudry et al., 2010).

In this way, Beaudry and

Pinsonneault’s (2010) emotional framework illustrates the similarities between appraisal
theories o f emotion and adaptive approaches to emotion (Nesse et al., 2009).
The impact o f negative emotions has received greater consideration in the
behavioral literature than positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998). IS security has more
often considered the role of negative emotions as well, most frequently through fear
appeals (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2010; Herath et al., 2009; Lee et al.,
2009). Compared to the information technology (IT) usage literature (Beaudry et al.,
2010; Venkatesh, 1999; Davis et al., 1992; Cenfetelli, 2004), the role o f positive
emotions has been examined less often in IS security. Additionally, when emotion has
been considered it has been in the form o f fear which is a single discrete negative
emotion (Egloff et al., 2003; DeSteno et al., 2004; Nabi, 2002). Discrete emotions “each
reflect a unique person-environment relationship, and thus are associated with different
goals and action tendencies designed to achieve those goals” (Nabi, 2002, p. 205). The
role o f emotion across the spectrum o f positive and negative discrete emotions is
examined in this chapter through the integration o f Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010)
framework o f emotion with Fredrickson’s (2001, 1998) broaden-and-build theory.
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The Broaden-and-Build Theory
The broaden-and-build theory posits that positive emotions broaden an
individual’s thought-action repertoire and increase the ability to process large amounts o f
information through a broadened scope o f attention (Fredrickson, 2001). Positive
emotions also build lasting psychological resources over time (Fredrickson, 1998;
Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson et al., 2005). Therefore, implicit in the broaden-and-build
theory are three distinct roles o f emotions: ( 1 ) a broadening role, (2 ) a narrowing role,
and (3) a building role (Fredrickson et al., 2005).

Broadening Role
The broadening role o f positive emotions impacts individuals in two distinct
ways. First, positive emotions broaden an individual’s ability to recognize and process
external cues (e.g. broadens scope o f attention and ability to process large amounts o f
information).

Second, positive emotions broaden an individual’s thought-action

repertoire. A broadened scope o f attention and cognitive processing is in line with Isen’s
(1999) assertions that positive affect generally influences “memory, learning, problem
solving and creativity, and flexibility in thinking.” A broadened scope o f attention also
increases cognitive variation, and cognitive variation results in an increase in the number
o f original ideas generated (Amabile et al., 2005). In the same way, as individuals
broaden their processing o f conditions relative to an issue, creativity in problem solving
arises (Fredrickson, 2004; Amabile et al., 2005). As employees seek to protect the firm
through their use o f and interactions with the firm’s IS (Posey et al., 2013), the increased
cognitive agility and broadened information processing that result from positive emotions
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(Isen, 1999; Fredrickson, 2004; Fredrickson et al., 2005; Amabile et al., 2005) provide
insiders with important resources for contributing to IS security.
Positive emotions also lead to the broadening o f an individual’s thought-action
repertoire. An individual’s thought-action repertoire is the collection o f thoughts and
actions cognitively available to an individual at a moment in time (Fredrickson et al.,
2005). Therefore, enactment o f the PMBs identified by Posey et al (2013) is contingent
upon the availability o f these behaviors to the actor at the time o f the behavioral stimulus.
The broaden-and-build theory implies insiders experiencing positive emotions are more
likely to have the known behaviors cognitively accessible in the face o f a security threat.
In this way, the broaden-and-build theory offers a partial remedy for the “knowingdoing” gap o f security behaviors (Workman et al., 2008) by explaining that securityrelated thought and behavioral diversity is enhanced by positive emotions.

Narrowing Role
In contrast to the broadening role o f positive emotions, there is an implicit
narrowing role o f negative emotions in the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson et al.,
2005). That there is a narrowing role to complement the broadening role does not imply
an inverse relationship between positive and negative emotions, however. Positive and
negative emotions do not produce opposite behaviors, but rather work in different ways
on cognition and behavior altogether (Isen, 1999). The narrowing role o f emotions is
rooted heavily in the aforementioned adaptive role o f emotions. Negative emotions elicit
specific action tendencies based on adaptive needs (Fredrickson et al., 2005; Cosmides et
al., 2000). These adaptive tendencies are considered to be innate and often evolved
mechanisms for increasing fit and therefore survival (Ohman et al., 2001; Cosmides et
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al., 2000; Nesse et al., 2009). For example, when fit is threatened, negative emotions such
as fear may be stimulated, which produce a state o f readiness for a specific action such as
“flight” (Nesse et al., 2009; Bagozzi et al., 1999). In this way, as predicted by the
broaden-and-build theory, the specific tendency brought about by fear narrows the
thought-action

repertoire

of the

individual

experiencing

the

negative

emotion

(Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001).
Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) original framework o f emotions classified
negative emotions associated with controllable consequences (e.g. fear, anxiety, worry,
distress) as “deterrence emotions.” However, these emotions are often associated with an
action tendency o f avoidance (Lazarus, 1991). Therefore, I have reclassified the bottom
right quadrant o f the emotional framework as “avoidance emotions.” This is an
appropriate reclassification as avoidance emotions are those which arise when an
individual appraises a stimulus as threatening fit, yet perceives control over the outcome
(i.e. the consequences are avoidable) (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et al., 2009).
Avoidance is an active adaptation due to the implied perception o f control over the
outcome (Carver et al., 1982). As IS security research continues to search for the
conditions o f efficacious emotional appeals (Crossler et al., 2012), the broaden-and-build
theory is a useful framework for considering the role o f emotions in relation to security
behaviors. As explained by the theory, negative emotions narrow individual’s thoughtaction repertoire and elicit an innate reaction.

Building Role
Finally, the broaden-and-build theory predicts that positive emotions build
significant, lasting psychological resources such as resilience, optimism, and creativity
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over time (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson, 1998). In this way, the broaden-and-build
theory can be seen as providing a framework for positive emotions in positive
psychology (Fredrickson, 2001). Positive psychology has been described as “the study o f
the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning o f
people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al., 2005). In their introduction o f positive
psychology, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) describe positive psychology as
focused on “the good life,” outlining positive characteristics such as well-being,
optimism, hope, and happiness, among others. Fredrickson et al. (2002) note that these
experiences o f positive emotions provide an “upward spiral” toward lasting psychological
resources. Core psychological resources associated with positive psychology have
recently become recognized as an individual’s PsyCap (Luthans et al., 2007a).

Psychological Capital
The broaden-and-build theory postulates that positive emotions build positive
resources such as resilience and optimism (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001;
Fredrickson et al., 2005). As a higher order construct made up o f hope, self-efficacy,
resilience, and optimism (Luthans et al., 2007a), PsyCap is a higher order construct
composed o f positive resource capabilities (Luthans et al., 2009). PsyCap has received
broad acceptance in business research and beyond (Avey et al., 2009; Walumbwa et al.,
2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011). In addition, PsyCap has been linked to a
number o f positive personal and organizational outcomes such as job performance and
satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), and low
turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009). PsyCap is also associated with increased
citizenship and decreased deviance (Avey et al., 2011).
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PsyCap Hope can be defined as a “positive motivational state that is based on an
interactively derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b)
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a).
PsyCap Resilience “is characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face o f
significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al.,
2002). Resilience can also be thought o f simply as “the positive psychological capacity to
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive
change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al.,
2007a). PsyCap Optimism is defined as that characteristic that is held by individuals who
“expect things to go their way, and generally believe that good rather than bad things will
happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 1985).

PsyCap Self-Efficacy is a role-breadth self-

efficacy and is defined as “the employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her
abilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources or courses o f action needed to
successfully execute a specific task within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p.
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;

Luthans et al., 2007a).
An important distinction o f PsyCap and perhaps one reason that it has been so
widely considered is that it has been shown to be composed o f characteristics that are
state-like rather than trait-like. Though research has often relied on context to inform the
true distinction between state and trait (Allen et al., 1981), there is an important
distinction to be made between trait-like and state-like characteristics (Zuckerman, 1983;
Fugate et al., 2012). This distinction is especially critical in a security context because
PsyCap, a construct composed o f state-like characteristics, has been shown to be
developable (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2006a; Peterson et al., 2011). This
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ductile quality of PsyCap distinguishes it from other, more stable, traits like “The Big
Five” personality traits (Goldberg, 1990) and the higher order “Core Self-Evaluation”
(Judge et al., 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). Therefore, any benefits to firm security which
can be shown to be attributable to PsyCap can be influenced by an organization through
an investment in employees’ PsyCap.

PsyCap as a Resource
PsyCap is also composed o f positive resource capabilities. Hobfoll (1989; 2002)
stipulates that individuals require resources for functioning, and they will seek to gain
available resources and when possible conserve unnecessarily expending resources.
Therefore, the conservation of resources has two components: building o f resources and
conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a resource can be built by either micro-intervention
(Luthans et al., 2007b) or by macro-intervention such as a supportive climate (Luthans et
al., 2008). In reference to conservation, resources are either “centrally valued in their own
right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can be
viewed as adaptive in that not only does PsyCap embody a positive psychological state,
as a psychological construct it serves meaningful ends. For instance, PsyCap has been
shown to provide a necessary psychological resource for psychological well-being
(Culbertson et al., 2010) ( see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1
Summary o f PsyCap Characteristics
PsyCap
Component

Definition

Micro-Development

PsyCap
SelfEfficacy

1. Mastery experiences
“[T]he em ployee’s conviction or
2. M odeling and vicarious learning
confidence about his or her abilities
3. Social persuasion
to m obilize the motivation, cognitive
4. Physiological and psychological arousal
resources or courses o f action needed
to successfully execute a specific
task within a given context”
(Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66)
1. Goal-setting
“[P]ositive motivational state that is
PsyCap
based
on
an
interactively
derived
2.
Participation
Hope
sense o f successful (a) agency (goal
3. Contingency planning for alternative
directed energy) and (b) pathways
pathways to attain goals
(planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et
al., 1991, p. 287).
Characterizes individuals who
1. Leniency for the past
PsyCap
“expect things to go their way, and
2. Appreciation for the present
Optimism
generally believe that good rather
3. Opportunity-seeking for the future
than bad things will happen to them.”
(Scheier et al., 1985).
“[T]he positive psychological
1. Asset-focused strategies such as enhancing
PsyCap
capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’
employability
Resilience
from adversity, uncertainty, conflict,
2. Risk-focused strategies such as proactive
failure, or even positive change,
avoidance o f adversity
progress and increased
3. Process-focused strategies to influence the
responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p.
interpretation o f adverse events
702)
Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge , Luthans, Youssef, et
al. (2007b).

Protection-Motivated Behaviors
Posey et al. (2013) identified PMBs as in- and extra-role behaviors that an insider
may undertake which protect the firm’s information and information systems. PMBs are
the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect ( 1 ) organizationally
relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that
information is stored, collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from informationsecurity threats (Posey et al., 2013). These protective behaviors were organized into a
systematic-based taxonomy o f fourteen categories (see Table 3.2 for summary, and Posey
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et al. (2013) for full discussion). As a general class o f behaviors, PMBs are robust to the
varying security policies that are inevitably found across organizations. For example,
compliance with an explicit security policy is clearly an in-role behavior, but the specific
behaviors required for that compliance vary across firms (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).

Table 3.2
PMB Clusters'
Identified Cluster Number and Name

4. Appropriate data entry and management________________________________________
3. Policy-driven awareness and action____________________________________________
8 . Wireless installation_________________________________________________________
2. Protection against unauthorized exposure_______________________________________
7. Verbal and electronic sensitive-information protection____________________________
9. Widely applicable security etiquette____________________________________________
12. Account protection_________________________________________________________
11. C o-w orker reliance_______________________________________________________________
13. Im m ediate reporting o f suspicious behavior_______________________________________

1. Legitimate e-mail handling___________________________________________________
6 . Secure softw are, e-m ail, and Internet use___________________________________________
5. Document conversion________________________________________________________
10. Distinctive security etiquette_________________________________________________
14. Equipment location and storage______________________________________________
'Table 3.2 from Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013_______________________________

Research Model and Hypotheses
This study examines the role o f emotion in IS security by empirically testing a
model which incorporates Beaudry and Pinsonneaulf s (2010) emotional framework into
Fredrickson’s (2001, 1998) broaden-and-build theory. As described, the broaden-andbuild theory entails three implicit hypotheses which are tested in this research: (1) a
broadening hypothesis, (2) a narrowing hypothesis, and (3) a building hypothesis. In
order to assess the hypotheses, emotions were identified from each quadrant o f Beaudry
and Pinsonneaulf s (2010) framework o f emotions. These discrete emotions arise out o f
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adaptive encounters and each elicit a distinct cognitive, psychological, or physiological
response (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus et al., 1984). Though each emotion has a specific
stimulus or referent, a single stimulus may elicit multiple discrete emotions o f varying
intensity simultaneously (Lazarus, 1991). In order to assess the adaptive role o f discrete
emotion in performance o f PMBs, the emotional reaction to thinking about protecting the
organization’s information and information system from security threats was ascertained
from organizational insiders.
Challenge emotions arise out o f an appraisal process which classifies an
adaptation-related stimulus as an opportunity over which the individual perceives him or
herself to have control (Beaudry et al., 2010). As such, challenge emotions are positive
emotions which exhibit an apparent fit enhancement opportunity (Nesse et al., 2009).
Lazarus (1991) describes one who has appraised a stimulus as a challenge. “A challenge
makes one feel good, and there is apt to be a considerable expansion o f one's functioning,
with relevant thoughts coming easily and with a subjective impression that one is
approaching the zenith o f one's powers” (1991, loc 373). This broadened thought pattern
elicited by challenge emotions mirrors the broadening hypothesis o f the broaden-andbuild theory. Further, the perceived control over the stimulus o f challenge emotions
exacerbates the approach tendency generally associated with positive emotions (Carver et
al., 1990; Cacioppo et al., 1999). As an example, the challenge emotion excitement has
been linked with task adaptation (Beaudry et al., 2010). It is hypothesized that the
elicitation o f challenge emotions will be positively related to PMBs.
H I: Challenge Emotions will be positively related to PMBs.
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Achievement emotions arise out o f an appraisal o f an opportunity for fit
enhancement with no perceived control over the outcome (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et
al., 2009). The broaden-and-build theory hypothesizes that certain positive emotions
work to build lasting psychological resources such as those conceptualized in PsyCap.
Fredrickson (2001) notes the building role o f positive emotions. “Joy can have the
incidental effect o f building an individual’s physical, intellectual, and social skills.
Importantly, these new resources are durable and can be drawn on later, long after the
instigating experience o f joy has subsided” (p. 305) . Based on the building role o f
positive emotions in the broaden-and-build theory, achievement emotions elicited by the
thought o f protecting the organization from security threats will be positively related to
PsyCap.
H2: Achievement emotions will be positively related to PsyCap.
Loss emotions arise out o f an appraisal o f a stimulus as being an uncontrollable
threat to fitness (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et al., 2009). As Lazarus (1991, loc. 108)
notes: “ [l]oss undermines our appreciation o f life and may lead to withdrawal and
depression.” In that way, loss taxes one’s psychological resources. PsyCap can be viewed
as positive resources which are taxed by loss emotions. Therefore loss emotions are
hypothesized to be negatively related to PsyCap.
H3: Loss emotions are negatively related to PsyCap.
Avoidance emotions arise out o f a threat appraisal paired with perceived control
over the outcome (Beaudry et al., 2010; Nesse et al., 2009). Perceptions o f control are
instrumental in motivating behavior o f all kinds (Carver et al., 1982). The elicitation o f
avoidance emotions have been widely found to be effective at inducing threat-avoidance
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behaviors in IS security (Johnston et al., 2010). However, the referent o f the emotion has
most often been a security threat (Johnston et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2010; Herath et
al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009). Therefore, by shifting the referent o f the emotion from the
threat itself to the protective behavior, it is expected that avoidance emotions will be
negatively related to PMBs.
H4: Avoidance emotions will be negatively related to PMBs.
Whether viewing PsyCap as a psychological resource or simply a psychological
state, the previously established links between PsyCap and organizational outcomes
provide a basis for the relationship between PsyCap and PMBs. For example, PsyCap has
been positively linked to an increase in both job performance and satisfaction (Luthans et
al., 2007a) as well as increased organizational commitment and citizenship (Avey et al.,
2011). As security continues to be adapted into organizational strategy through security
policy and otherwise, an increase in job performance, which includes security policy
compliance, will lead to an increase in organizational security (Siponen et al., 2006;
Herath et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The positive impact o f job satisfaction,
commitment, and citizenship are closely linked and are supported by findings that
individuals who are satisfied with their jobs are better organizational citizens and can be
expected to perform both in-role and extra-role behaviors to support the organization
(Bateman et al., 1983; Williams et al., 1991). The performance o f protective behaviors is
the focus o f this research and as such, it is expected that incorporating PsyCap will
increase PMBs in part by virtue o f the established relationships with increased job
performance, satisfaction, commitment, and citizenship.
H5: PsyCap will be positively related to PMBs.
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The preceding hypotheses deal with situational or referent-specific discrete
emotions and their consequences. However, much research indicates that individuals are
simultaneously impacted by relatively more stable and lingering affective states or even
traits (Fredrickson, 2001; Forgas et al., 2001; Kaplan et al., 2009). These more persistent
dispositions are largely independent o f one another and are generally referred to as
positive affect and negative affect (Diener et al., 1984; Cenfetelli, 2004). Positive affect
is linked to OCBs, and negative affect is related to a decrease in OCBs and to an increase
in CWBs (Kaplan et al., 2009). Given these findings it is hypothesized that positive affect
will have a positive relationship with PMBs, while negative affect will be negatively
related to PMBs (see Figure 3.2).
H6: Positive Affect will be positively related to PMBs.
H7: Negative Affect will be negatively related to PMBs.

Challenge Emotion*
H ope

Positive Affect

Interest

H6
Achievement Emotions

P rid e

H2
PsyC ep

PMBs

H5
Loss Emotions

H3.

Sad
A nger

f

H7.
Avoidance Emotions "N

^4

Anxiety
N egative Affect
F ear

Figure 3.2 Research Model
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Research Methodology
The multi-dimensional research model was tested empirically using survey
research methodology. The instrumentation for the survey was developed based on a
thorough literature review. Where possible, the items were adapted from prior research.
All the items included in the final survey were subjected to subject matter expert review
and were pilot tested before executing the final survey.

Study Measures
The first four hypotheses in the study ask respondents to report their emotional
reaction to taking action against security threats to their organization. As in Beaudry and
Pinsonneault (2010), 1 used Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) emotional intensity ratings to
ascertain the emotional reaction to dealing with threats to the firm’s security.
Respondents were asked the following: “When you think about protecting your
organization’s information and information system from security threats, to what extent
do you feel...” followed by indicators o f discrete emotions from each quadrant o f
Beaudry and Pinsonneaulf s emotional framework. The indicators were adapted from
Izard’s (1977) differential emotions scale (DES) and Fredrickson’s (2003) modified
differential emotions scale (MDES) and measured interest and hope (Challenge),
happiness and pride (Achievement), anger and sadness (Loss), and fe a r and anxiety
(Avoidance). The measures of anxiety were taken from Venkatesh’s (2000) measure o f
computer anxiety, which describes anxiety as making one feel nervous, threatened,
bothered, uncomfortable, and uneasy.
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PsyCap was measured using items adapted from the questionnaire developed by
Luthans, Youssef et al. (2007b). The original PsyCap Questionnaire includes twenty-four
items (six for each o f the four characteristics). The PsyCap items were all developed from
prior literature and have been executed successfully throughout the business literature.
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b).
PsyCap Hope measures state-hope and is “responsive to events in the lives o f
people” (Snyder et al., 1996, p. 321). PsyCap Hope captures both the agency and
pathway components of hope, and an example o f an item measuring PsyCap Hope is “I
can think o f many ways to reach my current work goals”(Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap
Resilience measures an individual’s ability to bounce back or to take stressful things at
work in stride (Wagnild et al., 1993). An example o f an item measuring resilience is “I
usually take stressful things at work in stride” (Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap Optimism
measures an individual’s state-belief that “good rather than bad things will happen to
them” (Scheier et al., 1985, p. 219).

An

example o f an item measuring PsyCap

Optimism is “I approach this job as if ‘every cloud has a silver lining’”(Luthans et al.,
2007b). Lastly, PsyCap Self-Efficacy measures the state-like role-breadth self-efficacy
and are based on Parker’s (1998) self-efficacy scale. An example o f an item measuring
PsyCap Self-Efficacy is “I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a
solution” (Luthans et al., 2007b).
Positive affect and negative affect were measured in this study using the
shortened positive affect/negative affect scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988; Mackinnon
et al., 1999). In order to capture general affectivity, the respondents were asked to
“indicate to what extent you generally feel this wav, that is how you feel on average.”
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The respondents rated a total o f ten affect-related adjectives on a seven point likert scale,
five reflecting positive affect and five reflecting negative affect.

A n alysis and R esults

The research model was analyzed in a two-step procedure as recommended by
methodologists (Gerbing et al., 1988). The analysis utilized the covariance-based
structural equation modeling (SEM) platform Mplus (Muthen et al., 1998-2010). In the
first step, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run in Mplus to establish the validity
o f the measures to be included in the subsequent structural model. Upon confirmation o f
the validity o f the research model, the hypothesized research model was assessed using
Mplus. Prior to the collection o f the data for the final analysis, the instrument was pilot
tested to confirm the validity o f the measures.

Instrument Development
Critical to any study is the validity and reliability o f the measures employed
(Straub, 1989; Gefen et al., 2011). As recommended, whenever possible the scales
included in this study were employed as previously published (Straub et al., 2004). The
instrument was assessed by subject matter experts and pilot tested with a convenience
sample o f ten organizational insiders. Upon completion o f the survey instrument, the
respondents in the pilot were directed to a separate form which allowed for feedback on
the instrument. Based on these preliminary analyses, the survey instrument was deemed
clear and appropriate.
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Primary Study
After analyzing the results o f the pretest and confirming the clarity o f the
instrumentation, responses were collected from a sample o f 421 organizational insiders.
Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full anonymity,
not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses, anonymity is
required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased anonymity in
multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity o f the respondents, and the
privacy o f respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data provider. Second,
respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having access to the survey
outside o f their organization’s network and computers. Providing anonymous, off-site
access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and appropriate for the
elicitation o f self-reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially undesirable behaviors
such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and organizational deviance
(Bennett et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003).
sample are summarized in Table 3.3.

The descriptive statistics o f the primary
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Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics o f Primary Sample
Average Age

44.62

Average Organizational Tenure

10.63

Gender

Female
Male

53.7%

Some high school
High school diploma
Some college
Associate’s or two-year degree
Undergraduate degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate/Professional degree

9.7%
17.6%
13.5%
38.5%
15.4%
4.8%
0.5%

Education

46.3%

IT Position
Management

14.5%
33.0%

Construct Validity
For the reflective measures included in the structural model, the standardized
factor loadings from a CFA analysis were considered along with the Cronbach’s alphas.
Also, the convergent and discriminant validity o f measures in the structural model were
assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and the Fornell-Larker criterion (i.e.,
comparison o f squared correlations with AVEs) as recommended by methodologists
(Hair et al., 2006; Hair et al., 2014) ( see Table 3.4).

78
Table 3.4
Full Measures in Study & Validity Statistics
Item s
Challenge
Em otions

Interest

H ope

A chievem ent
Em otions

H appiness

P ride

Loss
Em otions

A nger

Sad

A voidance
Em otions

F ear

M easures
“When you think about protecting your
organization’s information and
information system from security
threats, to what extent do you feel...”
Alert
Curious
Interested
Hopeful
Optimistic
Encouraged
“When you think about protecting your
organization’s information and
information system from security
threats, to what extent do you feel...”
Glad
Happy
Joyful
Proud
Confident
Self-assured
“When you think about protecting your
organization’s information and
information system from security
threats, to what extent do you feel...”
Angry
Mad
Annoyed
Sad
Unhappy
Discouraged
“When you think about protecting your
organization’s information and
information system from security
threats, to what extent do you feel...”
Scared
Fearful
Afraid

Scale1

Mean

STD

Load.

Scale1
c
c
c
c
c
c

Mean
3.86
2.89
3.67
3.37
3.62
3.49

STD
1.78
1.72
1.78
1.83
1.80
1.81

Load.
0.764
0.692
0.872
0.847
0.856
0.911

Scale1
c
c
c
c
c
c

Mean
3.54
3.53
3.00
3.52
4.10
3.77

STD
1.95
1.93
1.86
1.89
1.73
1.77

Load.
0.925
0.955
0.885
0.88
0.89
0.887

Scale1
c
c
c
c
c
c

Mean
1.84
1.81
2.17
1.86
1.92
2.06

STD
1.30
1.25
1.45
1.29
1.33
1.34

Load.
0.958
0.946
0.825
0.907
0.904
0.874

Scale1
c
c
c

Mean
1.81
1.89
1.84

STD
1.18
1.24
1.20

Load.
0.935
0.921
0.933
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Anxiety

PsyCap Hope
(PCH)

PCH-1
PCH-2
PCH-3
PCH-4
PCH-5
PCH-6
PsyCap
Resilience
(PCR)
PCR-2
PCR-3

PCR-5
PCR-6
PsyCap
Optimism
(PCO)
PCO-1
PCO-3

PCO-4

Nervous

c

2.19

1.42

0.838

Threatened
Uneasy
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your
level of agreement with the following
statements.''
If I should find m yself in a jam at
work, I could think o f many ways to
get out o f it.
At the present time, I am energetically
pursuing my work goals.
There are lots o f ways around any
problem.
Right now I see m yself as being pretty
successful at work.
I can think o f many ways to reach my
current work goals.
At this time, I am meeting the work
goals that I set for myself.
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your
level of agreement with the following
statements.”
I usually manage difficulties one way
or another at work.
I can be “on my own,” so to speak, at
work if I have to.
I can get through difficult times at
work because I’ve experienced
difficulty before.
I feel I can handle many things at a
time at this job.
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your
level o f agreement with the following
statements.”
When things are uncertain for me at
work, I usually expect the best.
I always look on the bright side of
things regarding my job.
I’m optimistic about what will happen
to me in the future as it pertains to
work.

c
c

2.14
2.16

1.38
1.40

0.827
0.888

Scale

Mean

STD

Load.

a

5.40

1.07

0.687

a

5.15

1.30

0.803

a

5.51

1.11

0.643

a

5.48

1.18

0.798

a

5.38

1.12

0.771

a

5.53

1.19

0.715

Scale

Mean

STD

Load.

a

5.59

0.99

0.79

a

5.91

1.09

0.616

a

5.54

1.05

0.724

a

5.63

1.07

0.734

Scale

Mean

STD

Load.

a

4.57

1.36

0.738

a

4.96

1.31

0.846

a

5.10

1.34

0.754
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Table 3.4 (Continued)

PCO-6
PsyC ap SelfEfficacy
(PCSE)
PCE-1

PCE-2

PCE-3
PCE-4

PCE-5
PCE-6
Protection
M otivated
Behaviors
(PM B)

PMB-1

PMB-2

PMB-3

PMB-4

PMB-5

I approach this job as if “every cloud
has a silver lining.”
(Luthans et al., 2007b)
Instructions: "Please indicate your
level o f agreement with the following
statements."
I feel confident analyzing a long-term
problem to find a solution.
I feel confident in representing my
work area in meetings with
management.
I feel confident contributing to
discussions about the company’s
strategy.
I feel confident helping to set
targets/goals in my work area.
I feel confident contacting people
outside the company (e.g., suppliers,
customers) to discuss problems.
I feel confident presenting information
to a group o f colleagues.
(Posey, 2010)
Instructions: “Given the following
statements, on what basis did you
engage in the stated behaviors in the
last year?”
I actively attempted to protect my
organization’s information and
computerized information systems
I tried to safeguard my organization’s
information and information systems
from their information security threats
1 took committed action to prevent
information security threats to my
firm’s information and computer
systems from being successful
I purposefully defended my
organization from information security
threats to its information and
computerized information systems
I earnestly attempted to keep my
organization’s information and
computer systems from harm produced
by information security threats

a

4.86

1.27

0.788

Scale

Mean

STD

Load.

a

5.43

1.18

0.816

a

5.44

1.31

0.819

a

5.09

1.42

0.791

a

5.44

1.24

0.811

a

5.18

1.46

0.736

a

5.46

1.32

0.788

Scale

Mean

STD

Load.

b

4.67

1.93

0.942

b

4.82

1.92

0.934

b

4.44

1.99

0.891

b

4.42

1.99

0.923

b

4.80

1.92

0.92
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Positive
Affect/
Negative
Affect
(PANAS)
Positive Affect
(PA)

Negative
Affect
(NA)

(Mackinnon et al., 1999)
Please indicate to what extent
vou generally feel this wav. that
is. how vou feel on the average.
Enthusiastic
Excited
Alert
Determined
Inspired
Nervous
Distressed
Upset
Scared
Afraid

Scale
c
c
c
c
c
c
c

c
c
c

Mean
4.45
4.03
4.68
4.90
4.19
2.61
2.45
2.45
2.06
2.07

STD
1.33
1.29
1.27
1.33
1.43
1.28
1.25
1.24
1.15
1.15

Load.
0.888
0.811
0.568
0.684
0.848
0.771
0.786
0.791
0.823
0.824

(R) = reverse scored item
'Scale:

a) Strongly Disagree - Strongly Agree
b) Never - Always
c) Not at all - Completely

The CFA o f lower-order constructs included in the study is characterized by
strong fit with a Chi-Squared o f 1857.50 with 1049 degrees o f freedom (goodness o f fit
index: CFI = 0.944; badness of fit index: RMSEA = 0.043). As shown in Table 3.4, most
o f the standardized loadings o f the reflective items were above a conservative 0.70 cutoff
criterion. A loading o f 0.70 indicates that the associated latent variable accounts for 50%
o f the variance in the indicator (Hair et al., 2006; Hair et al., 2014). The Cronbach’s alpha
o f each construct was within the recommendations o f prior research (Nunnally, 1978)
(see Table 3.5).

Lower-order Latent Variable Correlations
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and challenge emotion ‘interest’ (r=0.89), relative to the correlation between discrete emotion ‘h ope’ and ‘PsyCap H ope’ (r=0.35).

state of readiness” with a specific referent— in this case protection of the firm’s IS. This is supported by the strong correlations between discrete emotion ‘h o p e’
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Each lower-order construct exhibits strong convergence and reliability. However,
several o f the first-order constructs are highly correlated with one another. High
correlations among many o f the constructs are theoretically supported in the literature
such as the relationship between the facets o f PsyCap. Further, as suggested by Beaudry
and Pinsonneaulf s (2010) emotional framework, the emotions within each quadrant (i.e.
achievement, loss, etc.) are highly correlated with one another as well. The lack o f
discrimination among the facets o f PsyCap is appropriate as it is specified as a higherorder reflective construct. Construct specification is a topic o f considerable interest in IS
research, as the field seeks to employ second generation techniques with both theoretical
and statistical validity (Bagozzi, 2011; Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen et al., 2011; Straub et
al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2003). Constructs defined as first- and second-order reflective
appear most often in business research (Jarvis et al., 2003), and specify that the indicators
at each level “reflect” the latent variable (Straub et al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2012).
For the discrete emotions within each quadrant o f the emotional framework, however,
it is inappropriate to specify them as second order characteristics as fundamental to the
very nature o f discrete emotions is their distinction (DeSteno et al., 2004). Further, a
primary objective o f this study is to examine the impact o f discrete emotions from each
quadrant o f the emotional framework on the protection o f organizational resources.
Therefore, in order to examine the hypotheses in this study, two structural models were
ultimately examined. As shown in Figure 3.3, each model has a unique discrete emotion
from the four quadrants o f the emotional framework. All constructs in each model exhibit
convergence and discriminance as indicated by the ratio o f Fornell-Larker statistic and
latent variable correlations of < 1 .
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Figure 3.3 Research Model

Structural Model
Finally, the hypothesized relationships in the research model were tested using
■y

SEM. For model one, the Chi-Squared statistic and degrees o f freedom (X =2015.84 and
d.f.=1008; X 2 to d.f. ratio = 2.0) along with a goodness o f fit index (CFI =0.93) and a
badness o f fit index (RMSEA=.049) all indicate that the structural model has good fit
overall (Hu et al., 1999; Kline, 2010). Further, four o f seven hypothesized relationships
are significant and in the predicted direction. ( see Table 3.6.)
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Table 3.6

Structural Model Results - Model 1
Chi-Squared = 2015.84; d.f = 1008
CFN0.934; RMSEA=0.049
Hy
Path
p-value
Significance
Hypothesis
(direction)
Coefficient (one-tailed) (one-tailed)
P'k'k'k
HI Hope
PMBs (+)
0.306
<0 . 0 0 1
k k k
H2 Happiness -> PsyCap (+)
0.292
<0 . 0 0 1
kk
H3 Sadness -> PsyCap (-)
-0.149
0 .0 0 2
H4 Anxiety -> PMBs (-)
0.051
0.173
n/s
"k'k'k
H5 PsyCap
PMBs (+)
0.245
<0 . 0 0 1
H6 Positive Affect -> PMBs (+)
0 .0 2 1
0.376
n/s
H7 Negative Affect -> PMBs (-)
-0.045
0.208
n/s
Dependent Variable R Square
k kk
R 2 PMB
0.203
<0 . 0 0 1
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant

For model two, the Chi-Squared statistic and degrees o f freedom (X2=2052.36
and d.f.=1008; X 2 to d.f. ratio = 2.04) along with a goodness o f fit index (CFI =0.93) and
a badness o f fit index (RMSEA=.05) all indicate that the structural model has good fit
overall (Hu et al., 1999; Kline, 2010). Additionally, five o f the seven hypothesized
relationships are significant and in the predicted direction, (see Table 3.7.)
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Table 3.7

Structural Model Results - Model 2
Chi-Squared = 2052.36; d.f.= 1008
CFI=0.932; RMSEA=0.05
Path
p-value
Significance
Hy
Hypothesis (direction)
Coefficient (one-tailed) (one-tailed)
P***
HI Interest
PMBs (+)
0.344
<0 . 0 0 1
***
H2 Pride
PsyCap (+)
0.402
<0 . 0 0 1
*
H3 Anger PsyCap (-)
-0 . 1 0 1
0.019
*
H4 Fear -» PMBs (-)
-0 . 1 0 0
0.033
■kick
H5 PsyCap
PMBs (+)
0.204
<0 . 0 0 1
H6 Positive Affect
PMBs (+)
0.049
0.217
n/s
H7 Negative Affect
PMBs (-)
-0.025
0.325
n/s
Dependent Variable R-Square
k k k
R 2 PMB
0 .2 2 0
<0 . 0 0 1
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant

Controls and Rival Explanations
To substantiate the findings o f the structural model, the analyses were performed
again including several controls. As can be seen in Table 3.8, controls for age, tenure,
gender, and social desirability had no significant impact on the performance o f PMBs.
Conversely, whether or not an insider was a manager or an IT staffer did have a
significantly positive relationship with performance o f PMBs. Further, level o f education
completed as well as frequency o f organizational SETA programs were also significantly
positively related to the performance o f PMBs. Importantly, the significance and
direction o f all substantive variables remained consistent while controlling for these
plethora of insider characteristics ( see Table 3.8, Figures 3.4, and 3.5).
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Table 3.8

Structural Model Results Including Controls
Model 1
Model 2
Path
Significance Path
Coefficient (one-tailed) Coefficient
1esfetfc
0.218
0.246
***
0.291
0.403
**
-0.150
-0 . 1 0 1
0.016
n/s
-0.105
kick
0.194
0.164
0.045
n/s
0.049
-0.025
n/s
-0.024

Hyp. Hypothesis (direction)
HI
Hope ^ PMBs (+)
HI
Interest
PMBs (+)
H2
Happiness
PsyCap (+)
H2
Pride
PsyCap (+)
H3
Sadness
PsyCap (-)
Anger PsyCap (-)
H3
H4
Anxiety
PMBs (-)
H4
Fear -» PMBs (-)
H5
PsyCap ■) PMBs (+)
H6
Positive Affect
PMBs (+)
H7
Negative Affect -> PMBs (-)
Controls
0 .0 1 2
n/s
0 .0 1 1
Age
n/s
0 .0 1 2
Tenure
0 .0 1 1
*
0.079
Manager
0.076
***
IT Position
0.148
0.153
Gender
-0.013
n/s
-0.007
**
Education
0.116
0.126
***
SETA
0.243
0.235
n/s
0.075
Social Desirability
0.078
Dependent Variable R-Square
***
RJ
PMB
0.262
0.276
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p—0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant

Significance
(one-tailed)
kick
kkk
*
*
**
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
*
***
n/s
**
***
n/s
***
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Discussion
The results of the analyses provide support for the broaden-and-build theory o f
positive emotions. First, in line with the ‘broaden’ hypothesis o f broaden-and-build
model, discrete challenge emotions o f ‘hope’ and ‘interest’ were both significantly and
positively related to the performance o f PMBs. Second, in support o f the ‘build’
hypothesis, discrete achievement emotions o f happiness and pride were positively and
significantly related to PsyCap in both models.
Implicit in the broaden-and-build theory o f positive emotions is an inverse
relationship between negative emotions and personal outcomes. That is, there is also both
an implied ‘narrowing’ and ‘taxing’ hypothesis. The ‘taxing’ hypothesis was supported in
both models as the loss emotions o f sadness and anger were both negatively related to
insiders’ PsyCap. The ‘narrowing’ hypothesis received mixed support, with the discrete
emotion ‘fear’ negatively relating to PMBs, and ‘anxiety’ failing to relate significantly to
PMBs.
Insiders’ PsyCap was positively related to the performance o f PMBs in both
models. Additionally, the stable personality characteristics o f positive affect and negative
affect were not significantly related to PMBs in either model. Finally, the model was
robust to a plethora o f controls. Supporting the stability o f the model o f security emotion,
the significance and magnitude o f the controls were consistent across models. In both
models, controls for management, IT position, level of education, and SETA frequency
were significantly related to PMBs. Conversely, organizational tenure, age, and gender
were not significantly related to PMBs.

90
Implications and Contributions
This research makes important contributions to the behavioral information
security literature. Principally, the results impart the significant and diverse impact that
emotions play in the performance o f protective behaviors. The broaden-and-build model
provides a framework o f the disparate impact o f discrete positive and negative emotions
on both insiders’ behavioral tendencies and psychological resources. The importance o f
emotion to security is made manifest in the found direct and indirect influences o f
emotional experience on insiders’ performance o f PMBs.
Complementary to the broaden-and-build theory, this research goes further and
applies Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010) framework o f emotions to the broaden-andbuild model to ascertain the importance o f specific action tendencies o f four categories o f
emotions (challenge, achievement, loss, and avoidance). The results largely support the
classification o f emotions according to specific action tendencies (as in Beaudry and
Pinsonneault’s framework). In addition to similarities shared among the quadrants o f the
emotional framework, the results also support nuance among the discrete emotions, even
those which generally share the same specific action tendency (i.e. from the same
quadrant). Each emotion plays a unique role in the elicitation o f PMBs and the building
o f insiders’ PsyCap. For instance, interest was more strongly related to PMBs than hope,
and pride more strongly related to PsyCap than happiness. Interestingly, fear was
negatively related to PMBs, while anxiety had no significant relationship.
The findings provide research with an alternative view to the often negative
appeal to emotion (i.e. fear appeals) employed in security research (e.g. Johnston et al.,
2010). The research model elucidates the efficacy o f emotional appeals as relating to the
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specific action tendencies associated with the underlying discrete emotion. While the
action tendencies related to emotion are often considered to be evolved or innate, the
elicitation o f emotion can be manipulated through conditioning.

Further, emotional

stimuli result from adaptational encounters (Lazarus, 1991). This research ascertained
insiders' emotional reaction to protecting their firm from security threats, rather than their
response to the threats themselves. This distinction is important as it appropriately
measures emotion in response to an encounter rather than an object and explains a
negative relationship between fear and PMBs.
Organizations and researchers recognize the benefit o f emotional reactions;
however, as shown in the current study the referent o f the emotion is significant.
Therefore, the security benefit provided by fear appeals may be confounded or
diminished if the fear is elicited in terms o f actually protecting the firm. Further, the
research exhibits the significant role that positive emotions can play in increasing security
o f an organization. Insiders who feel hopeful and interested when thinking about
protecting their firm from security threats were more likely to engage in PMBs.
In addition to the direct impact o f challenge and avoidance emotions, achievement
and loss emotions were found to indirectly impact the performance o f PMBs through the
building (or taxing) of the positive psychological resource o f PsyCap. PsyCap is related
to myriad positive organizational and personal outcomes and is also linked in this
research to the performance o f PMBs. Both achievement emotions: pride and happiness,
were shown to relate positively to insiders’ PsyCap, while loss emotions were a tax on
insiders’ PsyCap.
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Finally, the more stable characteristics o f positive and negative affect were not
related to the performance o f PMBs. The insignificant effect o f positive affect and
negative affect (PANA) in this model is important for two reasons. First, the inclusion o f
PANA serves as an important control for the effect o f discrete emotions. Second, general
affect is not readily manipulated by an organization. Unlike discrete emotions, general
affect is not the result o f specific stimuli, but rather a measure o f the general experience
o f emotion of an individual. Therefore, the finding that insider mood is not a significant
predictor of PMBs allows organizations to focus on manipulation o f emotional response
to security-related stimuli rather than the screening employees for general affectivity ( see
Table 3.9).

Table 3.9

Summary o f Key Findings

Key finding

Significance to research

Significance to practice

Support for the broadenand-build model of
positive emotions in
behavioral information
security.

Broadens the theoretical
repertoire o f behavioral
information security
research to include a
positive security paradigm
incorporating the security
contribution o f positive
emotions.
Establishes the diverse
impact o f discrete emotions
on the performance o f
security-related behaviors
based on specific action
tendencies o f categories o f
emotions.

Provides organizations
with a framework within
which to manipulate
insiders’ positive emotional
reaction to security-related
stimuli.

Support for the disparate
impact o f discrete
emotions within Beaudry
and Pinsonneaulf s
emotional framework

Provides organizations
with an emotional schema
for eliciting securityrelated behaviors based on
the experience o f discrete
emotion in response to
specific security-related
stimuli.
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Table 3.9 (Continued)
Negative influence o f the
avoidance emotion fear on
PMBs.

Influence o f achievement
and loss on PsyCap

Influence o f PsyCap on
PMBs

No significant relationship
between PANA and
PMBs.

Provides evidence o f the
potentially confounding or
diminishing effect o f the
experience o f fear on the
performance o f PMBs
based on the elicitation o f
avoidance emotions in
response to protection of
the firm.
Establishes the relationship
between the experience o f
emotion in response to
security-related stimuli and
the positive resource
capabilities o f insiders and
myriad other positive
organizational outcomes
Evidences a direct link
between PsyCap and
organizational security for
future research.
Acts as an important control
for the establishment o f the
role o f discrete emotion in
behavioral information
security.

Highlights the potential
shortcoming o f fear appeals
on the elicitation of
security-related behaviors
based on the distinction
between fear response to a
threat and fear response to
protecting the firm.
Provides organizations
with a link between
emotion and insider’s
PsyCap and the many
positive organizational
outcomes associated with
PsyCap.
Further establishes the
positive personal and
organizational outcomes
attributable to PsyCap
Provides support for
organizational influence on
security outcomes from
stimuli induced discrete
emotion and removes the
burden o f screening for
general affect when
seeking to elicit PMBs
from insiders.

Limitations and Future Research
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence o f observational data o f
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the
behavior o f insiders. I took recommended precaution to ensure that individual anonymity
was preserved and responses were uninhibited. The data analyzed in this research was
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collected at a cross-sectional level with differences measured between randomly surveyed
organizational insiders. The research model ascertained the impact o f discrete emotion
on security-related behavior. The researcher’s inability to capture emotional responses
from insiders in an experimental setting creates an additional limitation. Due to the
difficulty in recalling past emotions, the instrument asked insiders to respond how they
feel when they think about protecting their organization from security threats, eliminating
the temporal disparity between the experience and the survey response.
The results highlight several important avenues o f future security research as well.
First, the results support the expansion o f the theoretical repertoire to include adaptational
approaches to security-related behavior such as the broaden-and-build theory. Second, the
results highlight the need for future research into the impact o f positive emotions in
behavioral information security and IS at large. Additionally, the research model exhibits
an important relationship between security and insiders’ PsyCap. As shown, an insider’s
emotional reaction to security had a significant impact on insiders’ PsyCap, and PsyCap
is positively related to PMBs. In the same way, this research links positive security
outcomes to other positive personal and organizational outcomes previously associated
with PsyCap. Finally, the research highlights the need for future research into the discrete
emotions which impact security. As can be seen, the emotional framework provides an
important categorization o f emotion; however, each discrete emotion retains unique
influence as well.

Conclusion
This chapter developed and applied a research model based on the broaden-andbuild theory while incorporating the classification o f emotions provided in Beaudry and
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Pinsonneault’s framework of emotions. The results o f the study indicate that discrete
emotions are impactful on the performance o f PMBs. The results support the concept
specific action tendencies espoused in an adaptational view o f emotions while
simultaneously confirming the nuance between discrete emotions. The elicitation o f
challenge emotions in the protection o f the firm stimulated PMBs in both models, while
the elicitation o f avoidance emotions had mixed results. The experience o f fear when
protecting the firm was negatively related to PMBs and anxiety had no relationship.
The results o f the research models tested also support the stated and implied
‘building’ and ‘taxing’ role o f emotions on personal resources. Achievement emotions
were positively related to PsyCap, while loss emotions were negatively related. These
emotions are indirectly related to PMBs as PsyCap was significantly related to the
performance o f PMBs. The influence o f PsyCap on PMBs adds to the myriad of positive
personal

and organizational

organizational literature.

outcomes previously

attributed

to

PsyCap

in the

Lastly, positive and negative affect were unrelated to the

performance o f PMBs. This lack o f influence o f PANA provides an important control for
the influence o f discrete emotion. Additionally, as PANA captures general disposition, its
lack o f significance highlights the importance o f investigating the impact o f discrete
emotions elicited by security-related disposition as opposed to general affectivity.

CHAPTER 4

SECURITY BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL: AN
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

Introduction
The digital age has ushered in a dynamic environment o f rapid innovation and
ubiquitous computing. The repercussions are global, as corporate mobile device usage
has reached the “tipping point” with 50% o f organizations worldwide allowing
employees to use mobile devices for tasks such as sales force automation, project

management, and email (Symantec, 2012). Recent surveys in the U.K. and Canada
indicate that employees access email and corporate documents from personal devices at
an increasing rate— often without oversight from their employer (CDW, 2013; Wilson,
2013). Additionally, 54% o f U.S. based organizations report an inability to determine if
off-site employees are using technology and informational resources within corporate and
regulatory requirements (Ponemon, 2013). In this connected environment, many
practitioners and academicians recognize that the information security o f most firms is
largely at the mercy o f those with access to the firm’s information and information
system (IS) (Moore et al., 2008; Boss et al., 2009; D'Arcy et al., 2007). This revelation—
fueled by frequent reportage o f data breaches— has rightfully led to copious articles
warning o f the threat o f the insider (e.g. Shaw et al., 1998; Boss et al., 2009; Vroom et
al., 2004; Willison et al., 2009; Greitzer et al., 2008). Users have even been declared the
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“weakest link” in IS security (Sasse et al., 2001). Fortunately, however, within the
greatest weakness often lies the greatest opportunity (Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Stanton et
al., 2005; Posey et al., 2013).
Evidence o f insider’s beneficial security behaviors has been presented in prior
research, ranging from basic security hygiene (Stanton et al., 2005) to policy compliance
(Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen et al., 2006; Herath et al., 2009). Providing a definitive
framework, Posey et al. (2013) systematically identified security roles— which they call
protection-motivated behaviors (PMBs)— that can be enacted by employees to transform
insiders from a security-related liability into an asset. PMBs are the volitional behaviors
organizational insiders can enact to protect ( 1 ) organizationally relevant information
within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS in which that information is stored,
collected, disseminated, and/or manipulated from information-security threats (Posey et
al., 2013). Organizational insiders are all individuals (e.g., full- and part-time employees,
temporary workers, consultants, board members) who have access to organizationally
relevant information while fulfilling their duties (Posey et al., 2013; Shaw et al., 1998).
Therefore, in order to most effectively secure the organization’s sensitive information and
IS, insiders should incorporate PMBs into their behavior and actively work toward the
protection o f informational resources.
PMBs are roles that may be unrelated to or even in direct contrast with an
insider’s formal job description. PMBs are enacted alongside the various organizational
roles held by all insiders with access to informational resources, creating behavioral
complexity for insiders (Posey et al., 2013). Behavioral complexity refers to “the ability
to act and play multiple roles that call for diverse and even competing behaviors” (Wu et
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al., 2010, p. 818). Hooijberg (1996) established that behavioral complexity is comprised
of two distinct components: (1) behavioral repertoire and (2) differentiation. Behavioral
repertoire is the portfolio o f roles an individual performs and his or her ability to perform
multiple roles, and differentiation is the ability to “switch from role to role at appropriate
times to handle paradoxes and contradictions mandated by one’s job” (Wu et al., 2010, p.
818).
PMBs are manifest in a security behavioral repertoire, which is distinct to each
insider (i.e. each user has his or her own unique repertoire o f behaviors to draw upon) and
are enacted across employees according to his or her ability to switch between roles. This
phenomenon is security behavioral complexity and is defined as an insider’s security
behavioral security behavioral repertoire-paired with his or her differentiation (Wu et al.,
2010; Hooijberg, 1996). Security behavioral complexity offers insight into what has
become known as the “knowing-doing” gap o f security behaviors in which employees
fail to enact known behaviors to protect the organization’s information and IS (Workman
et al., 2008).
An individual’s security behavioral repertoire can be thought o f as a set o f
behavioral resources from which the individual may draw. In addition to behavioral
resources, many theorists argue that effective adaptation is also dependent upon the
psychological resources o f the actor (e.g. Hobfoll, 1989; Hobfoll, 2002). One related
conceptualization o f personal resources comes from recent work in positive psychology:
psychological capital (PsyCap) (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b). Positive
psychology can be described as “the study o f the conditions and processes that contribute
to the flourishing or optimal functioning o f people, groups, and institutions” (Gable et al.,
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2005, p. 103), and PsyCap is a construct o f positive “psychological resource capabilities”
which are open to development (Luthans et al., 2009).
Behavioral complexity has recently been espoused as an antecedent to the
performance of PMBs (Posey et al., 2013), but has yet to be empirically examined. In
light o f this gap, I develop and empirically test a model o f behavioral security
complexity, which considers the impact o f security behavioral complexity and PsyCap
simultaneously.

Background
Decades ago, Straub and Nance (1990) predicted that the security-related impact
o f insiders would steadily increase over the years as average employees gain increased
computing ability through their use o f personal computers (PCs). This prediction has
proven to be prophetic as widespread computer use has not only come to fruition, but has
largely been eclipsed by the astounding penetration o f the Internet. Pew Research Center
reports that in the U.S. 78% o f all adults are now online, up from just 10% in 1995
(Zickuhr et al., 2012). Paralleling this rise o f access and ability o f insiders has been the
interest in behavioral information security. Behavioral information security is the study
o f “the human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity o f
information systems” (Stanton et al., 2006b, p. 263).
Today, the prevailing market is largely a knowledge economy in which
intellectual assets are a firm’s most valuable resources (Johnson et al., 2009). Therefore,
employees most often have the greatest access to their firm’s “crown jew els” (Stanton et
al., 2006a). The security o f a firm’s informational assets requires that firms incorporate a
holistic approach to security (Lee et al., 2002): incorporating up-to-date technical security
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mechanisms (Zafar et al., 2009), deterring detrimental behavior (e.g. computer abuse Straub et al., 1990; Johnston et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2012), and promoting protective
behaviors (e.g. PMBs - Posey et al., 2013). The implementation o f these diverse
protections leads to the emergence o f behavioral complexity for insiders (Posey et al.,
2013).
Security B eh avioral C om plexity

Behavioral complexity implies a confrontation with paradox (Posey et al., 2013;
Smith et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2010). Behavioral complexity— paired with cognitive
complexity and psychological resources— has been espoused to provide an individual
with the ability to “accept paradoxical tensions rather than respond defensively” (Smith et
al., 2011). Cognitive complexity refers to the ability to process stimuli in order to
undertake adaptation (Kiesler et al., 1982). Therefore, cognitive complexity can be
regarded as a necessary condition for handling complexity, while behavioral complexity
is the sufficient condition (Denison et al., 1995). Wu et al. (2010, p. 818) note “behavioral
complexity is the manifestation o f cognitive complexity that we can observe, evaluate
and benchmark.” Behavioral complexity is an important characteristic o f individuals
charged with enacting complex and/or paradoxical roles and serves as an appropriate
proxy for both cognitive and behavioral complexity. Posey et al. (2013) note, the concept
o f behavioral complexity enables researchers and practitioners to “explain, motivate, and
manage PMBs properly.” A primary goal o f this study is to introduce a model o f security
behavioral complexity into behavioral information security that provides a robust
framework within which to examine the enactment o f PMBs.
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Security Behavioral Repertoire
An individual’s behavioral repertoire represents the portfolio o f roles which an
individual is able to enact (Hooijberg, 1996; Wu et al., 2010). Behavioral repertoire may
also represent a domain specific collection o f roles— such as PMBs (Posey et al., 2013).
Posey et al.’s (2013) taxonomy o f PMBs provides a systematic-based classification o f the
security roles which make up the protective behaviors which an individual may have in
his or her security behavioral repertoire. Therefore, security behavioral repertoire is
defined as the collection o f protective security behaviors (i.e. PMBs) which an insider is
able to perform.
As implied in a model o f security behavioral complexity and confirmed in the
taxonomy o f PMBs, robust protection o f the firm’s informational assets and systems
requires that insiders hold various security roles within their security behavioral
repertoire. This view is unique to much extant security research which has focused on
singular behaviors such as anti-malware or anti-spyware software adoption (e.g. Lee et
al., 2009; Johnston et al., 2010) or compliance with formalized security polices (e.g.
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath et al., 2009; Vroom et al., 2004). Policy
compliance is an important goal o f any organization, but—as a subject o f empirical
research— investigations o f motivation and/or intention to comply with security policy
often fail to capture the ability to undertake the protective behaviors themselves. An
insiders’ security behavioral repertoire includes not only an insiders’ awareness o f policy,
but views the ability to comply with policy as a part o f a larger behavioral repertoire.
Additionally, software solutions are most often adopted by the IT department rather than
the ordinary users o f the system. Therefore, implementation o f security software best
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reflects an organization’s investment in IT security rather than the motivation o f insiders’
to protect the organization (Kumar et al., 2008; August et al., 2006).
Security research has also relied on general perceptions o f behavioral self-efficacy
as opposed to the more specific security behavioral repertoire (Herath et al., 2009;
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Workman
et al., 2008; Woon ct al., 2005). Many o f the identified roles which emerged from the
newly developed taxonomy o f PMBs have been examined in one form or another in past
research; however, security research has largely lacked the comprehensiveness offered by
a behavior complexity model (Zafar et al., 2009). For example, the protection o f
organizational resources has been examined in terms o f “values o f people” (Dhillon et al.,
2006), organizational climate (Chan et al., 2005), and even “social censure” (D'Arcy et
al.,

2011

), yet a research framework for assessing behavioral roles in concert with the

other implied roles o f information security has yet to be established. Incorporating
consideration o f the breadth and magnitude o f insiders’ security behavioral repertoire into
the research allows researchers to examine the ability to take on security roles across the
entire domain o f protective behaviors (e.g. PMBs) simultaneously.
Though prior research has made great strides in ascertaining the conditions o f and
antecedents to information security, the knowing-doing gap persists (Workman et al.,
2008). Behavioral complexity allows for an examination o f the impact o f insiders’
behavioral repertoire along with the complementary differentiation.

Security Differentiation
Differentiation is the ability to switch roles as demanded by the situation (Wu et
al., 2010; Hooijberg, 1996). Differentiation implies an improvisational view o f behavior,

103

incorporating behavioral diversity in a dynamic environment. The dynamism and
interrelatedness o f organizational behavior has led to anthropomorphic and metaphorical
descriptions for explanation. Drucker (2012) introduced a musical metaphor, analogizing
the role o f manager to that o f an orchestral conductor. Yet, according to Drucker, “neither
business nor government agency has a ‘score’ to play by” (Drucker, 2012 loc.30513052). Much like a jazz musician’s ability to fluctuate between solos and melodies,
tempos and time signatures, security differentiation is an insider’s ability to switch
between the various security behaviors incorporated in one’s security behavioral
repertoire (Wu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013). The jazz metaphor is instructive because
the players enact their skills not in a vacuum, but rather incorporate their repertoire of
abilities into a dynamic, spontaneous composition (Barrett, 1998).
Many insiders must safeguard both the sensitive information they have in their
possession as well as their access to the organization’s information system on an ongoing
basis (Ayyagari et al., 2011). Each task and environment is characterized by unique
security requirements, and consequently the effectiveness o f the protective response is
reliant upon the insiders’ security differentiation. Security differentiation is the ability of
an insider to effectively switch from one security role to another along the course o f his
or her work and is a core component o f the security behavioral complexity model (Posey
et al., 2013). Abilities such as those conceptualized by security behavioral complexity
may be necessary but insufficient conditions o f behavior, however, as behavior is a
function o f personal resources as well (Hobfoll, 2002).
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P sychological C apital

Hobfoll (1989) posits that individual’s draw on personal psychological resources
in order to maintain resilience in the face o f adversity. Similarly, it has been postulated
that personal characteristics such as equanimity equip one to deal with the tensions o f
divergent demands (Smith et al., 2011). Equanimity is a facet o f resilience which
characterizes one who maintains a balanced perspective, and resilience “connotes inner
strength, competence, optimism, flexibility, and the ability to cope effectively when faced
with adversity” (Wagnild, 2009, p. 105). Positive psychological resources such as
resilience have received greater consideration as a result o f the growing positive
psychology movement (Luthans et al., 2006b; Seligman et al., 2000). Positive psychology
has as its domain “optimal functioning” or what is referred to in positive psychology
literature as “flourishing” (Seligman et al., 2000). From this focus on optimal
functioning, PsyCap has emerged as a construct o f positive “psychological resource
capabilities” which are open to development (Luthans et al., 2009).
As a higher order construct, PsyCap is composed o f the distinct— yet related—
core tenets o f positive psychology o f hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy.
Positive psychology is uniquely able to contribute to the current behavioral security
research because it has the “average person” as its subject (Sheldon et al., 2001). In
addition, PsyCap has received broad acceptance in business research and beyond (Avey
et al., 2009; Walumbwa et al., 2011; Avey et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2011), and has
been linked to a number o f positive personal and organizational outcomes such as job
performance and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006),
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low turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), as well as increased citizenship and decreased
deviance (Avey et al., 2011).
PsyCap hope can be defined as a “positive motivational state that is based on an
interactively derived sense o f successful (a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b)
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287; Luthans et al., 2007a).
PsyCap resilience “is characterized by positive coping and adaptation in the face of
significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546; Masten, 2001; Masten et al.,
2002). Resilience can also be thought o f simply as “the positive psychological capacity to
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive
change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702; Luthans et al.,
2007a). PsyCap optimism is defined as that characteristic that is held by individuals who
“expect things to go their way, and generally believe that good rather than bad things will
happen to them.” (Scheier et al., 1985). PsyCap self-efficacy is role-breadth self-efficacy
and is defined as “the employee’s conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources or courses o f action needed to successfully
execute a specific task within a given context” (Stajkovic et al., 1998, p.
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; Luthans et

al., 2007a).
PsyCap can be viewed through a resource lens (Luthans et al., 2007b; Hobfoll,
1989; Hobfoll, 2002). Hobfoll (1989) stipulates that individuals require resources for
functioning, and they will seek to gain available resources and when possible conserve
unnecessarily expended resources. Thus, the conservation o f resources theory has two
components: building up o f resources and conservation o f resources. PsyCap as a
resource can be built by either micro-intervention or by macro-intervention such as a
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supportive climate (Luthans et al., 2008). In reference to conservation, resources are
either “centrally valued in their own right” or “as a means to obtain centrally valued
ends” (Hobfoll, 2002). PsyCap can be viewed as adaptive in that not only does PsyCap
embody a positive psychological state, as a psychological construct it serves meaningful
ends. For instance, PsyCap has been shown to provide a necessary psychological resource
for psychological well-being (Culbertson et al., 2010).
A distinguishing quality o f PsyCap and perhaps one reason that it has been so
widely considered is that it has been shown to be composed o f characteristics that are
state-like rather than trait-like. Though research has often relied on context to inform the
true distinction between state and trait (Allen et al., 1981), there is an important
distinction to be made between trait-like and state-like dispositions (Zuckerman, 1983;
Fugate et al., 2012). This distinction is important as it differentiates those characteristics
which are innate and inflexible from those which are malleable and developable.
Trainable characteristics are especially critical in a security context because they can be
developed within an organization to enhance organizational security. PsyCap is a
construct composed o f state-like characteristic and has been shown to be developable
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2006a; Peterson et al., 2011). Therefore, any
benefits to firm security which can be shown to be attributable to PsyCap can be
influenced by an organization through an “investment” in employees’ PsyCap. This
ductile quality o f PsyCap distinguishes it from other, more stable, traits like “The Big
Five” personality traits (Goldberg, 1990) and the higher order “Core Self-Evaluation”
(Judge et al., 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). Peterson (2012) notes:
“People’s locus o f control and self-esteem are things a manager probably
can’t change significantly within a few weeks. Psychological capital is
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more malleable. W e’re not born hopeful, resilient, optimistic, efficacious
people. We learn these things.”
The facets o f PsyCap and established facet-level development strategies
are summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1
Summary o f PsyCap Characteristics

PsyCap
Component

Micro-Development

Definition
“[T]he employee’s conviction or confidence
about his or her abilities to mobilize the
motivation, cognitive resources or courses of
action needed to successfully execute a
specific task within a given context”
(Stajkovic et al., 1998, p. 66)

•
•

PsyCap
Hope

“[Pjositive motivational state that is based on
an interactively derived sense o f successful
(a) agency (goal directed energy) and (b)
pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder
et al., 1991, p. 287).

•
•
•

PsyCap
Optimism

Characterizes individuals who “expect things
to go their way, and generally believe that
good rather than bad things will happen to
them.” (Scheier et al., 1985).

•
•

“ [T]he positive psychological capacity to
rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity,
uncertainty, conflict, failure, or even positive
change, progress and increased
responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702)

•

PsyCap
SelfEfficacy

PsyCap
Resilience

•
•

•

•

•

Mastery experiences
Modeling and vicarious
learning
Social persuasion
Physiological and
psychological arousal
Goal-setting
Participation
Contingency planning for
alternative pathways to
attain goals
Leniency for the past
Appreciation for the
present
Opportunity-seeking for
the future
Asset-focused strategies
such as enhancing
employability
Risk-focused strategies
such as proactive
avoidance o f adversity
Process-focused strategies
to influence the
interpretation o f adverse
events

Adapted from descriptions in Psychological capital: Developing the human competitive edge, Luthans, Youssef, et
al. (2007b).
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Research Model and Hypotheses
Based on the definition o f behavioral complexity, security behavioral complexity
entails an insider’s security behavioral repertoire and their ability to enact the roles
appropriately, termed security differentiation (Hooijberg, 1996; Wu et al., 2010). An
insider’s security behavioral repertoire is reflected by the roles o f protective behaviors
identified by Posey et al. (2013) and adapted into a formative construct in this research.
Therefore, as described by behavioral complexity, it is hypothesized that security
behavioral complexity— composed o f security behavioral repertoire and security
differentiation— positively impacts an insider’s performance o f PMBs.
H I: Security Behavioral Repertoire will be positively related to PMBs.
H2: Security Differentiation will be positively related to PMBs.
Effectually performing PMBs requires behavioral complexity as the roles
identified in an insider’s security behavioral repertoire are often paradoxical and
contradictory (Posey et al., 2013). Whether viewing PsyCap as a psychological resource
or a positive psychological state, the previously established links between PsyCap and
organizational outcomes provide a basis for the relationship between PsyCap and PMBs.
For example, PsyCap has been positively linked to an increase in both job performance
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a) as well as increased organizational commitment
and citizenship (Avey et al., 2011). The positive impact o f job satisfaction, commitment,
and citizenship are closely linked and are supported by findings that individuals who are
satisfied with their jobs are better organizational citizens and can be expected to perform
both in-role and extra-role behaviors to support the organization (Bateman et al., 1983;
Williams et al., 1991). Furthermore, PsyCap— by virtue o f its association with resilience
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and equanimity— is a valuable resource for handling divergent demands or enacting
paradoxical roles (Smith et al., 2011). Therefore, PsyCap is hypothesized to be positively
related to PMBs (see Figure 4.1).
H3: PsyCap will be positively related to PMBs.

t

Security B ehavioral
R epertoire

P rotection M otivated
B ehaviors

Security D ifferentiation
BEHAVIORAL C O M PL E X IT Y

P sychological C apital
F irst-O rd er Reflective

r
i

:

*1 S eco n d -O rd er Reflective
•

F irs t-O rd e r F orm ative

Figure 4.1 Security Behavioral Complexity Research Model

R esearch M eth od ology

The multi-dimensional research model was tested empirically using survey
research. The instrumentation for the survey was developed based on a thorough
literature review. Where possible, the items were adapted from prior research. All the
items included in the final survey were subjected to subject matter expert review and pilot
tested using a representative sample o f organizational insiders from a large public
university in the Southeastern United States. The data for the published analyses was
collected using an online panel o f organizational insiders. Panels are especially
appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full anonymity, not simply
confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses, anonymity is required to
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encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased anonymity in multiple ways.
First, the researchers never know the identity o f the respondents, and the privacy of
respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data provider. Second, respondents’ real
and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having access to the survey outside o f their
organization’s network and computers. Providing anonymous, off-site access to selfreport surveys has been shown to be adequate and appropriate for the elicitation o f selfreported incidences o f sensitive and even socially undesirable behaviors such as
protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and organizational deviance (Bennett
et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003).

Measurement Models
As shown in Figure 4.1, the research model utilizes three distinct latent model
structures: first-order reflective constructs, a first-order formative construct, and a
second-order reflective construct. Construct specification is a topic o f considerable
interest in IS research, as the field seeks to employ second generation techniques with
both theoretical and statistical validity (Bagozzi, 2011; Gefen et al., 2000; Gefen et al.,
2011; Straub et al., 2004; Jarvis et al., 2003). The ultimate goal o f all model specification
is to appropriately model theoretical relationships; therefore, the on-going discussion
regarding the theoretical justification and statistical validity is an important one (AguirreUrreta et al., 2012; Jarvis et al., 2012).
The various forms o f model specification are “derived from the fact that (a) a
first-order construct can have either formative or reflective indicators, and (b) those firstorder constructs can, themselves, be either formative or reflective indicators o f an
underlying second-order construct” (Jarvis et al., 2003). Constructs defined as first- and

I ll
second-order reflective appear most often in business research (Jarvis et al., 2003), and
specify that the indicators at each level “reflect” the latent variable (Straub et al., 2004;
Jarvis et al., 2012). All o f the models specified as reflective in the research model were
each adapted from prior literature (Luthans et al., 2007b; Wu et al., 2010).
Security behavioral repertoire was developed from the previously developed
taxonomy o f PMBs (Posey et al., 2013). The developed construct is specified as firstorder

formative

based

on

Wu

et

al.’s

(2010)

repertoire

construct

and

the

formative/reflective decision rules provided in prior literature (Jarvis et al., 2003; Petter
et al., 2007). Specifically, Wu et al. (2010) measured behavioral repertoire as “the
composite o f the multiplicative effect o f the means o f each o f the four roles.” As noted by
Diamantopoulos (2011), modeling a construct with formative specification in partial least
squared (PLS) utilizes composites. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 4.1, security
behavioral repertoire is specified as formative and will be modeled with PLS as a
composite latent variable. This formative specification is in line with previous model
specifications in IS (Anderson et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2010).

Measures in Study
Security behavioral repertoire was measured formatively with items capturing
each role o f PMBs established in prior research (Posey, 2010). In order to empirically
assess the impact o f an individual’s personal repertoire o f security behaviors, I first
developed an all-inclusive formative measure o f security behavioral repertoires from the
published taxonomy o f PMBs. The items developed to measure the 14 security roles are
shown in Table 4.2. The final construct used in the analysis was refined according to the
formative construct specifications in literature.
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Table 4.2
Items Developed to Measure 14 Security Roles
R ol
1

Item

4

I am able to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate email requests.
I can protect my organization's sensitive information that I control from
unauthorized exposure.
I have the skills to fulfill the requirements o f my organization's information
security policy.
I know how to dispose o f the organization's unneeded sensitive documents and
backup important documents.

5

I know how to convert sensitive, corporate documents to other formats to reduce
potential alterations from their original content by security threats.

2
3

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

I am able to use my work-related software (e.g. email clients and Internet
browsers) securely.
I know what information in my organization is sensitive and should not be
disclosed, whether verbally or electronically.
I know whether or not I am allowed to set up my own wireless access point at
I know how to perform the general security-related tasks required o f all
employees at work.
I know how to perform security-related tasks specific to my position at work.
I have the ability to remind my co-workers o f information-security guidelines
and policies and inform co-workers when thev are violating organizational rules.
I am able to protect my work-related accounts by safeguarding my log-in
I can identify when my co-workers are using IT suspiciously and report it to
management.
I am able to keep electronic devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, PDAs) issued to me
by my organization either safely stored under lock and key or with me at all

Security differentiation was adapted from the five-item measure o f behavioral
differentiation used in Wu et al. (2010). The measures were adapted from a context o f
supply management to reflect security differentiation. An example o f an item measuring
security differentiation is “I adapt my behavior to effectively secure my firm’s sensitive
information.”
PsyCap was measured using the questionnaire developed by Luthans, Youssef et
al. (2007b). The PsyCap Questionnaire includes twenty-four items (six for each o f the
four characteristics). The PsyCap items were all developed from prior literature and have
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consistently exhibited validity and test/retest reliability throughout the business literature.
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2007b).
PsyCap hope measures state-hope and is “responsive to events in the lives o f
people” (Snyder et al., 1996, p. 321). PsyCap hope captures both the agency and pathway
components o f hope, and an example o f an item measuring PsyCap Hope is “I can think
o f many ways to reach my current work goals”(Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap Resilience
measures an individual’s ability to bounce back or to take stressful things at work in
stride (Wagnild et al., 1993). An example o f an item measuring resilience is “I usually
take stressful things at work in stride” (Luthans et al., 2007b). PsyCap optimism measures
an individual’s state-belief that “good rather than bad things will happen to them”
(Scheier et al., 1985, p. 219). An example o f an item measuring PsyCap optimism is “I
approach this job as if ‘every cloud has a silver lining’”(Luthans et al., 2007b). Lastly,
PsyCap self-efficacy measures the state-like role-breadth self-efficacy and are based on
Parker’s (1998) self-efficacy scale. An example o f an item measuring PsyCap selfefficacy is “I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a solution” (Luthans et
al., 2007b).
PMBs were measured with a five-item scale developed based on Posey et al.’s
(2013) taxonomy o f protection-motivated behaviors. An item assessing the performance
o f PMBs is “I tried to safeguard my organization’s information and information systems
from their information security threats.”

A n alysis and R esults

The research model was analyzed in a two-step procedure as recommended by
methodologists (Gerbing et al., 1988). The analysis utilized partial least squared (PLS)
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based structural equation modeling (SEM) platform, SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). In
the first step, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run in order to establish the
reliability and validity o f the reflective measures to be included in the subsequent
structural model. Upon confirmation o f the validity o f the research model, the
hypothesized research model was assessed using SEM. Prior to the collection of the data
for the primary analysis, the full instrument was pilot tested.

Pilot Study
Critical to any study is the validity and reliability o f the measures employed
(Straub, 1989; Gefen et al., 2011). As recommended, whenever possible the scales
included in this study were employed as previously published (Straub et al., 2004). The
instrument was pilot tested with a sample o f 42 MBA students from a large public
university in the Southeastern United States. All the students used for the pilot were
either currently employed or had previous work experience. The descriptive statistics o f
the pilot sample are summarized in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics o f Pilot Sample
Average Age
Average Organizational Tenure
Gender
Female
Male
IT Position
Management

24.26
1.66
31%
69%
4.8%
12.2%

The data from the pilot test was used to examine the validity o f the reflective
measures to be used in the study. The pilot test construct statistics were ascertained using
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partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in SmartPLS (Ringle et al.,
2005). Overall, the results o f the pilot test provide evidence o f the initial validity o f the
measures to be used in the full study— the exception being SBD4 which failed to load on
the differentiation construct. The construct loadings from the pilot test are summarized in
Table 4.4.

Table 4.4
Pilot Study Construct Loadings

SBD1
SBD2
SBD3
SBD4
SBD5
PMB1
PMB2
PMB3
PMB4
PMB5
PCO
PCSE
PCH
PCR

Security
Behavioral
Differentiation
0.700
0.851
0.756
0.040
0.746

PMBs

PsyCap

0.949
0.926
0.946
0.874
0.941
0.808
0.896
0.914
0.925

In addition to viewing the standardized loadings, I also examined the convergent
and divergent validity o f the constructs by calculating the latent variable correlations, the
Cronbach’s alpha, and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each o f the constructs.
The convergent and divergent statistics for the pilot study measures excluding SBD4 are
summarized in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5
Pilot Study Correlations
Security
Behavioral
Differentiation
(SBD)
SBD
0.83*
PMB
0.4279
PsyCap
0.4578
*AVE’s bolded along diagonal

PMB

PsyCap

0 .8 6

0.3871

0.79

Cronbach’s
a
0.8971
0.9593
0.9189

Primary Study
After analyzing the results o f the pilot test and confirming the initial validity of
the instrumentation, responses were collected from a sample o f 414 organizational
insiders. Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full
anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses,
anonymity is required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased
anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity of the
respondents, and the privacy o f respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data
provider. Second, respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having
access to the survey outside o f their organization’s network and computers. Providing
anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and
appropriate for the elicitation o f self-reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially
undesirable behaviors such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and
organizational deviance (Bennett et al., 2000; Bennett et al., 2003).
statistics o f the primary sample are summarized in Table 4.6.

The descriptive
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Table 4.6
Descriptive Statistics o f Primary Sample
Average Age
Average Organizational Tenure

45.59
10.58

Gender

53.1%
46.9%
0.2%
11.4%

Education

Female
Male
Some high school
High school diploma
Some college
Undergraduate degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate/Professional degree

IT Position
Management

25.6%
41.5%
16.4%
4.8%
15.2%
33.8%

This study employed one formative construct, security behavioral repertoire,
which was developed based on a previously published taxonomy o f PMBs. In order to
assess the validity o f security behavioral repertoire, first, the content validly o f the items
was examined by subject matter experts. Second, the statistical and practical significance
o f each formative indicator was assessed through the significance and magnitude o f the
coefficient. Finally, the collinearity o f the selected formative items was assessed by
calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each indicator from regression analyses.
The validity of the measure o f security behavioral repertoire was assessed
according to the recommendations for formatively specified constructs (Hair et al., 2014).
First, the content validity o f the security behavioral repertoire measures was established.
Formative measures are modeled to include no measurement error (Bagozzi, 2011);
therefore, the formative items are said to fully explain the latent variable. An error in
content validity is manifest in the absence o f an item which should be included in order to
fully represent the construct domain. The formative items measuring security behavioral
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repertoire were developed directly from a taxonomy o f PMBs (Posey et al., 2013). The
taxonomy o f PMBs was developed for an identical context (security) and population
(organizational insiders). Second, the collinearity o f the items was assessed by running
regressions o f each item on the others in order to ascertain the VIF level o f each item.
Items with a VIF of greater than ten are said to suffer from multicollinearity, while those
with a VIF o f five or less are conservatively assessed to have no multicollinearity
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Flair et al., 2014; Hair et al., 2006). The correlations o f the 14 roles
are shown in Table 4.7.
As expected with such a large number o f related, yet distinct roles, the items are
correlated with one another with a range o f correlation from 0.329 - 0.705. In order to
refine the measure o f PMB roles, the 14 indicator construct was analyzed using PLS
SEM in SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). PLS was chosen for the analysis because of
identification issues arising from the inclusion o f a formative measure with many
indicators.
The initial omnibus security behavioral repertoire construct included 14 security
roles and failed to converge using covariance-based SEM. PLS does not share the
identification issues with covariance-based SEM. Therefore, analyzing in PLS allows for
convergence (Hair et al., 2014). In addition to the PLS analysis, the VIF for each item
was calculated by running individual regressions with each item as the dependent
variable. The item weights, average VIF, and significance o f each role are shown in
Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8
PMB Role Statistics
PMB Role
1
2

3
4
5
6

7
8

9
10
11
12

13
14

Legitimate e-mail handling
Protection against unauthorized exposure
Policy-driven awareness and action
Appropriate data entry and management
Document conversion
Secure software, e-mail, and Internet use
Verbal and electronic sensitive-information
Wireless installation
Widely applicable security etiquette
Distinctive security etiquette
Co-worker reliance
Account protection
Immediate reporting o f suspicious behavior
Equipment location and storage

Avg. VIF

2.43
2.44
2.36
2.39
2.43
2.38
2.39
2.42
2.42
2.50
2.40
2.44
2.43
2.44

Weight

T-Statistic

0.1862
0.3052
-0.0756
0.2218
-0.1066
0.3701
0.1872
-0.085
0.0822
0.247
-0.2363
0.1384
-0.0182
0.0497

1.3551
2.3111
1.9078
1.1169
0.1508
0.4151
2.6241
0.5355
1.5859
0.8465
2.6375
1.2446
0.6164
0.609

Many o f the 14 roles included initially in the construct o f PMB roles failed to

exhibit statistical and practical significance. Although none o f the VIF statistics surpassed
the rule o f thumb o f five, the high correlations shown in Table 4.7 along with the counter
intuitive weights and lack o f significance o f many items make it clear that the construct
should be subjected to refinement. Therefore, an iterative process o f isolating the
significant roles making up an insider’s security behavioral repertoire was undertaken. I
set as an initial decision-rule one-tailed statistical significance o f a =

0 .1 0

(t-statistic

1.282). This allowed me to retain only those roles which were significantly influencing
the construct o f security behavioral repertoire while not being overly restrictive in terms
o f nomological and content validity.
As a result, eight o f the 14 roles met the significance criteria for further analyses.
The collinearity diagnostics were re-run for these eight roles and they were assessed for
adequate domain breadth. The significance o f the eight roles along with the collinearity
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diagnostics are exhibited in Table 4.8. These roles represent both broad and specific
security behaviors (i.e. email use and task specific etiquette), as well as technical and
social aspects o f security (i.e. secure software use and co-worker reliance). They also
include physical as well as intellectual protections (i.e. unauthorized exposure and verbal
disclosures) as well as systems protection (i.e. account protection). Therefore, the eight
roles are said to meet the criteria for a valid measure o f an insider’s security behavioral
repertoire (see Table 4.9).

Table 4.9
Security Behavioral Repertoire Correlations and T-Statistics
Rolel
Legitimate e-mail
handling
Protection against
unauthorized exposure
Appropriate data entry
and management
Secure software, email, and Internet use
Verbal and electronic
sensitive-information
protection
Distinctive security
etiquette
Co-worker reliance
Account protection

Role2

Role4

Role6

Role7 Role 10 Rolel 1 Role 12

TStatistic
1.441

1
.392

1

.666

.329

1

.606

.440

.615

1

.588

.507

.565

.703

1

.477

.401

.496

.430

.494

1

.591

.517

.567

.641

.692

.487

1

.473

.594

.504

.602

.637

.441

.606

2.709
1.546
2.768
1.468
2.337
1.947
1

1.367

For the reflective measures included in the structural model, the standardized
factor loadings from a CFA analysis were considered along with the Cronbach’s alphas.
Also, the convergent and discriminant validity o f measures in the structural model were
assessed with average variance extracted (AVE) and the Fornell-Larker criterion (i.e.,
comparison of squared correlations with AVEs) as recommended (Hair et al., 2006; Hair
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et al., 2014). The items from the full study and their respective loadings are shown in
Table 4.10, followed by the statistics o f convergence and discriminance.

Table 4.10
Full Measures in Study
Security Behavioral
Repertoire

Measures

Scale' Spec." Mean STD

I am able to differentiate between
Role 1: Legitimate elegitimate and illegitimate email
mail handling
a
requests.
Role2: Protection I can protect my organization's
against unauthorized sensitive information that I control
from unauthorized exposure.
a
exposure
I know how to dispose of the
Role4: Appropriate
organization's unneeded sensitive
data entry and
documents and backup important
management
documents.
a
I am able to use my work-related
Role6: Secure
software, e-mail, and software (e.g. email clients and
a
Internet use
Internet browsers) securely.
Role7: Verbal and I know what information in my
electronic sensitive- organization is sensitive and should
not be disclosed, whether verbally
information
a
or electronically.
protection
I know how to perform securityRole 10: Distinctive
related tasks specific to my position
security etiquette
at work.
a
I have the ability to remind my co
workers o f information-security
Rolel 1: Co-worker
guidelines and policies and inform
reliance
co-workers when they are violating
a
organizational rules.
I am able to protect my workRole 12: Account
related accounts by safeguarding
protection
my log-in information.
a
Security
Differentiation
Adapted from (Wu et al., 2010);
Scale
(SBD)
I adapt my behavior to effectively
SBD-1
secure my firm ’s sensitive
information.
a

Wt.

F

5.58

1.45

0.156

F

4.11

1.80

0.299

F

5.70

1.43

0.168

F

5.22

1.62

0.348

F

5.18

1.62

0.168

F

5.21

1.72

0.225

F

5.13

1.68

0.219

F

4.78

1.72

0.142

Spec.

Mean

STD

Load.

R

5.13

1.486 0.798
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Table 4.10 (Continued)

SBD-2

SBD-3

SBD-4

SBD-5
PsyC ap Hope
(PCH )
PCH-1

PCH-2
PCH-4
PCH-5
PCH-6
PsyC ap Resilience
(PCR)
PCR-2
PCR-3
PCR-4
PCR-5
PCR-6

I adjust my approach to my work in
order to handle various security
threats.
I take on different security roles at
work such as complying with
security policy and policing co
workers.
At work, I may go from screening
an illegitimate email request to
appropriately discussing my firm's
sensitive information with a trusted
party.
When doing different work tasks, 1
often play different security roles.
From (L uthans et al., 2007b)
If I should find m yself in a jam at
work, I could think o f many ways to
get out o f it.
At the present time, I am
energetically pursuing my work
goals.
Right now I see m yself as being
pretty successful at work.
I can think o f many ways to reach
my current work goals.
At this time, I am meeting the work
goals that I set for myself.
From (L uthans et al., 2007b)
I usually manage difficulties one
way or another at work.
1 can be “on my own,” so to speak,
at work if I have to.
I usually take stressful things at
work in stride.
I can get through difficult times at
work because I’ve experienced
difficulty before.
I feel I can handle many things at a
time at this job.

PsyC ap O ptim ism
(PCO )

F rom (L uthans et al., 2007b)

PCO-1

When things are uncertain for me at
work, I usually expect the best.

a

R

4.67

1.615 0.862

a

R

3.97

1.863 0.864

a

R

3.94

1.870 0.770

a

R

4.01

1.861

0.850

Scale

Spec.

Mean STD

Load.

a

R

5.34

1.057 0.757

a

R

5.14

1.334 0.768

b

R

5.41

1.054 0.815

b

R

5.29

1.246 0.830

b

R

5.45

1.118 0.833

Scale

Spec.

Mean

STD

a

R

5.64

.989

0.852

a

R

6.01

1.069

0.780

a

R

5.18

1.202

0.738

a

R

5.61

1.069

0.872

a

R

5.65

1.111

0.831

Scale

Spec.

a

R

Mean STD
4.81

Load.

Load.

1.263 0.834
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PCO-3
PCO-4
PCO-6
PsyCap SelfEfficacy (PCSE)
PCSE-1
PCSE-2

PCSE-3
PCSE-4

PCSE-5

PCSE-6
Protection
Motivated
Behaviors (PMB)
PMB-1

PMB-2

PMB-3

I always look on the bright side o f
things regarding my job.
I’m optimistic about what will
happen to me in the future as it
pertains to work.
I approach this job as if “every
cloud has a silver lining.”
From (Luthans et al., 2007b)
I feel confident analyzing a long
term problem to find a solution.
I feel confident in representing my
work area in meetings with
management.
I feel confident contributing to
discussions about the company’s
strategy.
I feel confident helping to set
targets/goals in my work area.
I feel confident contacting people
outside the company (e.g.,
suppliers, customers) to discuss
problems.
I feel confident presenting
information to a group o f
colleagues.

a

R

5.03

1.521

a

R

5.09

1.277 0.825

a

R

4.96

1.421

0.818

Scale

Spec.

Mean

STD

Load.

a

R

5.43

1.143

0.822

a

R

5.45

1.274

0.824

a

R

5.05

1.375

0.805

a

R

5.543 1.250

0.772

a

R

5.17

1.482

0.700

a

R

5.32

1.347

0.808

Scale

Spec.

b

R

4.87

1.900 0.948

b

R

4.94

1.877

0.922

b

R

4.52

1.983

0.916

0.887

Adapted from (Posey, 2010)
I actively attempted to protect my
organization’s information and
computerized information systems
I tried to safeguard my
organization’s information and
information systems from their
information security threats
1 took committed action to prevent
information security threats to my
firm ’s information and computer
systems from being successful

Mean STD

Load.
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Table 4.10 (Continued)

PMB-4

PMB-5

'Scale:

"Specification:

1 purposefully defended my
organization from information
security threats to its information
and computerized information
systems
I earnestly attempted to keep my
organization’s information and
computer systems from harm
produced by information security
threats
a) Strongly Disagree - Strongly Agree
b) Never - Always

b

R

4.36

1.994

0.880

b

R

4.90

1 .8 8 6

0.938

R) reflective
F) formative

As shown in Table 4.10, a few items were eliminated from the analysis for failing
to load significantly on their respective constructs. However, all reflective constructs
retained at least four items o f which the standardized loadings o f the retained reflective
items were above a conservative 0.70 cutoff criterion. A loading o f 0.70± indicates that
the associated latent variable accounts for 50% o f the variance in the indicator (Hair et
al., 2006; Hair et al., 2014). Supporting the validity o f the items, the Cronbach’s alpha o f
each construct was within the recommendations o f prior research (Nunnally, 1978), and
the constructs exhibited convergence and discriminance as indicated by the AVE and
latent variable correlations.

Structural Model
Finally, the hypothesized relationships in the research model were tested using
PLS SEM. Unlike covariance-based SEM, PLS analyses do not provide goodness o f fit
statistics, but rather are assessed by the construct validity and the significance o f the
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resultant paths (H air et al., 2014). A s can be seen in T ables 4.11 and 4.12, all three o f the
hypothesized relationships w ere significant and in the predicted direction.

T able 4.11

Primary Study Correlations
Security
D ifferentiation
(SD )
SD
PM B

PMB

PsyCap

Cronbach’s
a
0.89

0.69*
0.4279

P syC ap
0.4578
*AVE’s bolded along diagonal

0.96

0.85
0.3871

0.95

0.51

T able 4.12

Structural Model Results
Hypothesis
Path
Hyp. (direction)
Coefficient T-value
4.914
HI
Security Behavioral R epertoire
PM Bs (+) 0.33
H2
Security differentiation-^ PM Bs (+)
0.18
2.911
H3
P syC ap-^ PM Bs (+)
0.14
2.931
Controls
0.09
Age
2.038
Tenure
-0.04
1.211
Gender
0.01
0.052
Management
0.03
0.982
IT Staff
0.03
1.180
Bold = supported; *p=0.05; **p=0.01; ***p=0.001; n/s=not significant

Significance
(one-tailed)
***
**
**
*
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s

In an effort to establish the robustness o f the m odel o f security behavioral
com plexity, the structural m odel w as also run w hile controlling for the age, gender,
organizational tenure and w hether the insider w as a m em ber o f either m anagem ent or the
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organization’s IT staff. In addition, the model was also re-run three additional times
including distinct potential rival explanations each time. The security behavioral
complexity model was robust to controls for age, gender, and tenure simultaneously, as
well as managerial support for security, security locus o f control, and social desirability,
separately (see Figure 4.2).

Controls:
In clu d ed Sim ultaneously:
A ge
S ex
T enure
M an ag er
IT P o sitio n
In clu d ed S eparately:

Account Protection

Co worker Reliance

S o cia l D esirability
M anagerial S u p p o rt fo r S'
S ecu rity L o c u s o f C 'ontro

Verbal & Electronic Sensitive
Info Protection

Legitimate Email Handling
Security Behavioral
Repertoire

Protection Against
Lnautborized Exposure

Distinct Security' Etiquette

Appropriate
Data entrv and Management
Secure Software. Email, and
Internet I se

Security Differentiation

BEHAV IORAL C OMPLEXITY

R- = 34%
Protection Motivated
Behaviors

Hope
Resilience
Psychological Capital
Optimism

First Order Re

Self-Efficacy

First Order Fo
i Second Order

Figure 4.2 Security Behavioral Complexity Results
2 The reduced model including demographic controls is no longer under-identified and was assessed in
covariance-based SEM to confirm the results. PsyCap, 0.21, ***; Repertoire, 0.35,***; security
differentiation, 0.22,** (construct, path coefficient, significance)
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Common M ethod Variance
All o f the indicators in the study were measured by self-report survey items.
Although IS research has been shown to be less susceptible to common method variance
(CMV) than other disciplines (Malhotra et al., 2006), as a further assessment o f the
validity of the findings an analysis o f CMV was performed. Study design is an important
step in avoiding

CMV in empirical research (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In order to

minimize the effect o f CMV in the reported results, several steps were taken in the study
design. (1) Respondents were assured o f their anonymity by having access to the survey
off-site and with a survey organization with which they have a trusted relationship. ( 2 )
Within each question set the items were randomly ordered for each respondent,
eliminating any systematic bias in the ordering o f the items. (3) The question order was
counterbalanced with antecedent variables, consequence variables, and control variables
dispersed throughout the instrument so as to minimize the likelihood that the responses to
independent variables would impact the response to potential dependent variables. The
instrument was pilot tested to ensure that the question order did not introduce cognitive
labor. (4) The instrument used reverse-order questions as well as “please resp o n d

”

questions in order to identify those respondents who were answering carelessly. (5) Each
item was carefully worded to eliminate any biasing effect o f item ambiguity.
Given that the analysis was performed using PLS SEM, the methods o f detecting
and potentially correcting for CMV are more limited than those in covariance-based SEM
(Ronkko et al., 2011). Recently, a marker variable technique has been espoused which
can be used to detect methodological bias in PLS (Ronkko et al., 2011). Despite the
efforts to reduce common method bias in the single source data, such a marker variable
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was included in the study to allow a post-hoc analyses o f CMV. The marker variable
included was a construct measuring an individual’s feelings about the color blue. An
example o f an item measuring blue affinity is “I prefer blue to other colors.” The
responses are a seven point likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree to strongly
agree.” The use o f this variable is more rigorous than using, for example, a demographic
response because it is o f the same type (i.e. seven-point Likert scale) as the substantive
variables in the study (Ronkko et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2010). The correlation matrix
o f the substantive, controls, and marker variable are shown in Table 4.13.
The minimum total correlation in the study is 0.00 between differentiation and
organizational tenure. However, the minimum correlation between every substantive
variable and the marker variable is 0.13. To assess whether or not the relationship
between the substantive variables are impacted by a methodological bias, the marker
variable was included in the structural model as an antecedent to the single endogenous
variable, PMBs. In this way, any variance explained by the theoretically unrelated
variable should be associated with methodological bias rather than a true relationship.
The marker variable acts as a control o f method bias.
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As recommended, the impact to significance and magnitude resulting from the
inclusion o f the marker variable should be assessed. The changes observed between the
baseline model and the marker variable model are shown in Table 4.14. The marker
variable failed to significantly explain variance in the endogenous variable (R2 o f both
models was 34%). Further, the significance and magnitude o f all three substantive
variables were unchanged when the marker variable was included in the analysis. These
results indicate that method bias is not responsible for the explanation o f the dependent
variable. Additionally, as discussed, the substantive variables remained significant in the
presence o f a control for social desirability as well, which further supports a lack o f bias
in the results.

Table 4.14

Results o f Common Method Variance Analysis
Hyp.
HI
H2
H3

Hypothesis
(direction)
Security behavioral rep erto ire-^
PM Bs (+)
Security differentiation-^ PM Bs
(+)
P syC ap-^ PM Bs (+)

Path
Coefficient T-value T-value Significance
Coefficient
A
A
A
0.33
4.896 0.018
0.18

0.14
Controls
Age
0.10
Tenure
-0.05
Gender
0.00
Management
0.03
IT Staff
0.03
Mar <er Variable
Blue
0.012
*p=0.05; **p=0.0l; ***p=0.001; n/a=not applicable

-

2.882

0.089
-

-

.01
.01
.01
-

-

n/a

2.881

0.050

-

-

-

0.004

-

2.083
1.215
0.033
1.027
1.162

0.019
0.045
0.018

-

0.499

n/a

-

-

-
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D iscussion

The results o f the analysis indicate that the security behavioral security
complexity model provides a robust, multidimensional framework o f PMB motivation.
The three core hypotheses o f security behavioral complexity were supported in the
analysis and were robust to the inclusion o f controls, rival explanations, and a commonmethod marker construct. As predicted, an individual’s security behavioral repertoire is
positively related to the performance o f PMBs. Security differentiation, or the ability of
an insider to differentiate his or her protective behavior according to the situation, was
also positively related to the performance o f PMBs. Further, as predicted, insiders’
PsyCap was positively related to PMBs as well, indicating that PsyCap does provide a
necessary resource for taking on the paradoxical roles required by modem information
security. Additionally, the varying means and standard deviations o f the roles within
security behavioral repertoire support the supposition that insider repertoires vary in both
breadth and magnitude.

Implications and Contributions
This research makes several important contributions to the behavioral information
security literature. First, the study establishes the influence o f insiders’ security
behavioral repertoire on the performance o f PMBs. The results underscore the diverse
nature o f the roles within each insider’s security behavioral repertoire as well, with
varying means and standard deviations across the roles. The positive relationship between
insiders’ security behavioral repertoire and PMBs reveals that the broader an insider’s
repertoire, the greater likelihood that the insider will enact security roles through the
performance o f PMBs. By capturing security roles through Likert scales, the measures
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also capture the magnitude o f each role within the insider. Therefore, the results also
indicate that the more deeply held the conviction that he or she can enact the roles, the
greater the performance of PMBs. Additionally, the formative measure o f security
behavioral repertoire provides a relative measure o f importance o f each role in leading to
the enactment o f the broad category o f PMBs.
The influence o f security behavioral repertoire provides organizations with
evidence o f the importance o f training the protective security roles individually.
Reviewing the formative measurement indicates that certain roles are more strongly
related to the performance o f PMBs. This realization leads to two conclusions (1) the
return to security is unequal across all roles and (2) certain roles do not lead to behavior
either because the role is not required or the insider fails to employ a known protection.
Therefore, this research provides a measure o f effectiveness of the protective roles
identified in prior research. Organizations seeking to incite protective behaviors from
employees must ensure that the insiders hold the appropriate behaviors within their
security behavioral repertoire.
In order to effectively enact the security roles within one’s security behavioral
repertoire, employees must also be able to switch from one o f the roles to another along
the course o f work. This research provides initial empirical support for this phenomenon
which is termed security differentiation. The significance o f security differentiation is
important for both research and practice. First, insiders who are able to multi-task or
change security roles according the dynamic threats encountered in the workplace are
more likely to engage in PMBs. This establishes the significance o f an important
security-related personal characteristic. Organizations seeking to increase security may
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seek to train employees to differentiate their behavior or may use this characteristic for
screening employees for organizational roles which encounter the most diverse security
threats. This significance is summarized in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15
Summary o f Key Findings
F in d in g

S ign ifican ce to research

S ign ifican ce to practice

Varying significance,
coefficients, means, and
standard deviations of
roles included in security
behavioral repertoire.

Establishes the uniqueness
o f each insider’s security
behavioral repertoire and
the relative influence of
each role on the
performance o f PMBs.
Provides evidence that
insiders propensity to enact
behaviors to protect the
firm is directly related to
the roles which they hold in
their security behavioral
repertoire.
Establishes the role o f
multi-tasking or behavioral
diversity on the
performance o f PMBs and
identifies an important
security-related
characteristic for inclusion
into behavioral information
security.
Provides support for the
significant role of
psychological resources in
the enactment o f divergent
security roles such as
PMBs.

Informs organizations as to
the uniqueness o f each
insider’s repertoire of
security roles and the
relative influence o f each
role on PMBs.
Provides support for
organizational training o f
individual security roles in
order to increase security by
eliciting PMBs from
insiders.

Security behavioral
repertoire’s positive
relationship with PMBs.

Security differentiation’s
positive relationship with
PMBs

PsyCap’s positive
relationship with PMBs.

Provides organizations with
an important characteristic
for security-related
screening and/or training.

Links PsyCap to security,
further establishing the
positive personal and
organizational outcomes
attributable to employees’
PsyCap.

Finally, beyond the behavioral complexity (repertoire and differentiation), the
PsyCap o f the insider was a significant antecedent to the performance o f PMBs. As
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defined previously in the chapter, PsyCap is a set o f positive resource capabilities. When
dealing with the diverse roles required by modern information security, insiders require
psychological resources in order to handle the resulting behavioral tensions. PsyCap
provides a measure o f these resources and is a significant contributor to the security
behavioral complexity research model tested here.

Limitations and Future Research
There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence o f observational data of
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the
behavior o f insiders. I took recommended precaution to ensure that individual anonymity
was preserved and responses were uninhibited. Additionally, the data for this research
was collected at a cross-sectional level with differences measured between randomly
surveyed organizational insiders. As such, this research is an appropriate and important
initial validation of the security behavioral complexity model, but research remains to be
completed within individuals and at an organizational level.
Eight o f the fourteen roles identified as the full taxonomy o f PMBs were
significantly related to the performance o f PMBs. As measured by the security behavioral
complexity model, this research examines the relative importance o f the roles in insiders’
performance o f PMBs. Future research remains to examine PMBs at the organizational
level in order to ascertain the absolute importance o f PMBs in protecting organizations
from security threats. Additionally, future research should examine the potential
effectiveness o f each role in protecting the organization. In that way, organizations will
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have a measure o f the possible, absolute impact o f each role as well as the actual, relative
impact o f each role.
The impact o f differentiation is also an important area for future research.
Research remains to establish the ability o f organizations to manipulate employee’s
differentiation. To the extent that differentiation is a malleable characteristic,
organizations can increase security by training the diverse enactment o f security roles.
Additionally, the research supports the notion that employees have varying abilities to
differentiate their security behaviors.

Future research remains to examine the

characteristics o f individuals which make them more likely to differentiate their security
behaviors. Finally, future research should examine the ability o f insiders to differentiate
across organizational roles. For example, it may be shown that some departments are
more secure due to the self-selection o f high differentiators.
Finally, future research should continue to examine the role o f positive
psychology and positive psychological facets such as those conceptualized in PsyCap in
information security. This research adds to the myriad positive outcomes attributable to
PsyCap and supports the notion that protective behaviors are impacted positively by
positive psychological factors. The security behavioral complexity model is a trainable
model, as insiders can have their repertoire expanded and their PsyCap built. Future
research should seek to establish effective security programs that capitalize on the
malleable qualities o f these antecedents to security behaviors in order to maximize the
protection o f firms’ information and information systems.
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Conclusion
This dissertation chapter introduced and empirically examined a novel model o f
security behavioral complexity. The model o f security behavioral complexity empirically
examines the impact o f an insider’s security behavioral repertoire, differentiation, and
PsyCap on the ultimate performance o f PMBs.

The results support the model as an

appropriate and effective framework o f insiders’ performance o f PMBs. Eight o f the
fourteen PMB roles were retained in the measure o f an insider’s security behavioral
repertoire and they exhibit the diverse nature o f security behaviors in today’s connected,
techno-centric business and social environments. The retained roles parallel the complex
nature o f insider’s protection o f information and IS. The roles are both broad and specific
(i.e. email use and task specific etiquette), as well as technical and social (i.e. secure
software use and co-worker reliance). They also include physical as well as intellectual
protections (i.e. unauthorized exposure and verbal disclosures), as well as systems
protection (i.e. account protection).
In addition to merely holding each role within one’s behavioral repertoire, the
research highlights the inherent role o f behavioral diversity in order to enact the various
behaviors. This ability is referred to as security differentiation in the chapter and together
with security behavioral repertoire makes up behavioral complexity as defined in prior
literature. Drawing from the field o f positive psychology, this research improves the base
model o f behavioral complexity by including the psychological resource capabilities o f
the actor as a significant antecedent to PMBs. The security behavioral complexity model
significantly explains over a third o f the total variance in the performance o f PMBs and is
robust to controls and rival explanations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

This dissertation and the three studies contained herein empirically examine novel
research models in behavioral information security. Central to the research is the
relationship between insiders’ PsyCap and information security. The findings exhibit the
fundamental relationship between information security and PsyCap with support for
PsyCap as both an antecedent to security behavior and a consequence o f security
expectancies. Additionally, the studies incorporate the same dependent variable,
performance o f protection motivated behaviors (PMBs). The consistency o f both PsyCap
and PMBs across research models provides a central theme for the investigation o f the
impact o f PsyCap in behavioral information security. PMBs as a dependent variable are
o f particular importance as they represent behaviors across the domain o f protection
motivated behaviors which an insider can undertake. The specific results o f the three
studies are summarized in the remainder o f this chapter followed by a recounting o f the
conclusions drawn from the studies. In addition to summarizing the dissertation findings,
the limitations in the dissertation research and opportunities for future research are
articulated.
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Summary of Dissertation Findings
This concluding chapter next includes a summary o f the dissertation findings. The
findings o f the studies are recapitulated along with a discussion o f study-specific
limitations and conclusions. Following the specific findings, general conclusions o f the
dissertation as a whole are detailed.

Study I: A Multi-Dimensional Assessment o f Organizational
Insiders ’ Performance o f Protection-Motivated Behaviors:
An Expectancy Theory Approach
The first study examined an expectancy-theory based model o f insiders’ security
behavior. Expectancy theory espouses a relationship between valence, instrumentality,
and expectancy (VIE) and behavioral motivation. Beyond the relationship between the
VIE model and behavioral motivation, the research also examined organizational
influence on these dimensions through security education training and awareness
(SETA). Finally, the relationship between expectancy dimensions and psychological
resources (PsyCap) were also investigated. The motivation to perform protection
motivated behaviors (PMBs) was conceptualized as motivation to perform and
withdrawal from performance o f protective behaviors.
Nine o f the thirteen hypothesized relationships were supported in the analysis.
The findings support the significant impact o f the expectancy dimensions (VIE) on the
motivation to and withdrawal from PMBs. As hypothesized, security expectancy and
security valence were positively related to protection motivation. Conversely, security
valence was negatively related to security withdrawal. In addition the impact o f SETA on
expectancy dimensions was uniformly supported across the VIE model.

Therefore, the

security expectancy research model provides a framework for security training for
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organizations. Though expectancy theory has been employed at both the within and
between individual level in past research, some have argued that expectancy theory is
most appropriate for analyzing motivational changes within individuals. However, the
robust performance o f expectancy between individuals supports its use as a framework o f
security behavior across individuals. Given the significance o f the research model, future
research can use this expectancy-based framework to examine within individual impacts
resulting from manipulations such as training sessions ( see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1 Study One Research Model Summary

Finally, a significant relationship between the expectancy theory measures of
instrumentality and expectancy and PsyCap was established in this research. However,
PsyCap was not significantly related to either protection motivation or security
withdrawal. Future research should continue to examine the relationship between
insiders’ PsyCap and security behaviors. Specifically, the role of PsyCap as a resource
for security behavior, as a potential moderator of important relationships, and as a
dependent variable in IS research should be explored.
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Study 2: The Adaptive Role o f Emotion in Information Security:
Broadening the Theoretical Repertoire
The second study developed and examined a novel model o f emotion in
behavioral information security. The study offers a complementary emotive-behavioral
model to the cognitive-behavioral models which are employed often in IS research. The
results o f the analysis support the broad influence o f emotion in behavioral information
security. The research integrates a newly developed framework o f emotion with the
broaden-and-build theory. Through this integration, the research examines the influence
of discrete emotions taking into account the specific action tendencies o f each quadrant
of the emotional framework ( see Figures 5.2 and Figure 5.3).
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The discrete emotions were analyzed in two separate models, each with a separate
discrete emotion from each quadrant o f the emotional framework. The results elucidate
the impact o f discrete emotions and support the tenants o f the broaden-and-build theory.
Challenge emotions with their specific action tendency o f behavior were positively
related to PMBs. Achievement emotions, which are associated with psychological
resources, were positively related to PsyCap. On the negative side o f the framework, loss
emotions were negatively related to PsyCap, and avoidance emotions had mixed results.
Anxiety had no relationship with PMBs, while fear was negatively related to PMBs.
Lastly, the impact o f lingering positive and negative affect were examined in the model
and were found to have no impact on PMBs.
Emotional research is not without inherent limitation. The researcher’s inability to
capture emotional responses from insiders in an experimental setting creates a limitation
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in measurement. Due to the difficulty in recalling past emotions, the survey instrument
employed in this research asked insiders to respond how they feel when they think about
protecting their organization from security threats. Though not experimental, this
technique eliminates the temporal disparity between the experience and the survey
response.
The emotion-based research model supports the expansion o f the theoretical
repertoire to include adaptational approaches to security-related behavior such as the
broaden-and-build theory, and highlights the need for future research into the impact o f
positive emotions in behavioral information security and IS at large. Additionally, the
research exhibits the importance o f research into discrete emotions in behavior
information security. As shown in this study, Beaudry and Pinsonneault’s (2010)
emotional framework provides an important categorization o f emotion; however, each
discrete emotion retains unique influence as well.

Study 3: Security Behavioral Complexity and Psychological
Capital: An Empirical Examination
The third and final study in the dissertation developed and examined a model o f
security behavioral complexity. Behavioral complexity is comprised o f behavioral
repertoire and differentiation. The model o f security behavioral complexity includes the
core components o f behavioral complexity, security behavioral repertoire and security
differentiation, along with the positive psychological resource o f PsyCap.
The findings support the influence o f security behavioral complexity on the
performance o f PMBs by organizational insiders. All three core hypotheses in the model
were supported and robust to controls. The results contribute to both research and
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practice in several important ways. First the research establishes the influence o f
behavioral complexity in information security. The impact o f security behavioral
repertoire on PMBs supports the notion that insiders’ performance o f PMBs is related to
the security behavioral repertoire o f insiders. The relationship between security
behavioral repertoire and PMBs provides organizations with a framework for developing
training programs (SETA). The positive influence o f differentiation evidences the
importance o f behavioral diversity in modern information security. Finally, the influence
o f PsyCap indicates that in light o f behavioral complexity, psychological resources are
influential in behavior as well ( see Figure 5.4).
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The results o f the security behavioral complexity research present opportunities
for future research. For example, future research remains to establish the potential
effectiveness o f each role which an insider may hold in his or her security behavioral
repertoire. The influence o f security differentiation also presents an area for future
research. Researcher into the malleability o f security differentiation would establish the
most appropriate mechanism by which to increase security in light o f the impact o f
differentiation, whether through training differentiation or screening for levels of
differentiation.

D issertation L im itations

There are inherent limitations in self-reported security research, and to a large
extent this research is no exception. However, due to the absence o f observational data o f
actual security behaviors, survey instruments are an accepted medium for ascertaining the
behavior o f insiders. I took recommended precaution to ensure that individual anonymity
was preserved and responses were uninhibited. Additionally, the data for this research
was collected at a cross-sectional level using an online panel with differences measured
between randomly surveyed organizational insiders.
Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data as they offer full
anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature o f security responses,
anonymity is required to encourage candid responses, and panels provide increased
anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity o f the
respondents, and the privacy o f respondents is guaranteed and governed by the data
provider. Second, respondents’ real and perceived anonymity is enhanced by having
access to the survey outside of their organization’s network and computers. Providing
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anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been shown to be adequate and
appropriate for the elicitation o f self-reported incidences o f sensitive and even socially
undesirable behaviors such as protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al., 2013) and
organizational deviance (Bennett et ah, 2000; Bennett et ah, 2003). Finally, all
instruments were pilot tested before execution. As such, the dissertation results were
based on the surveying o f four unique samples— two pilot study samples and two large
online panels.

Final C on clu sion s and F uture R esearch

The dissertation examined the role o f PsyCap in behavioral security. The role of
PsyCap as an important consequence o f and antecedent to security-related constructs was
established in the work. The dissertation sets the stage for significant future research in
behavioral information security. First, future research into the relationship between
PsyCap and information security should be researched further. The studies reveal PsyCap
to be a significant antecedent and consequence o f security-related constructs. The role o f
PsyCap in information security highlights the importance o f psychological resources in
the protection o f the firm’s informational assets. In this hyper-connected organizational
environment, the psychological resources o f all those with access to proprietary
information is likely to be an important future consideration. Additionally, the almost
daily reportage o f insider misbehavior support future research into the role that positive
psychological resources may play in the commission o f deviant behaviors as well.
The dissertation also provides support for the investigation into PMBs. All three
dissertation studies explore theoretical frameworks for the explanation o f performance o f
PMBs. As a construct reflecting a general class o f protective behaviors, research into
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PMBs allows for consideration across the full domain o f protective behaviors
simultaneously. Future research remains to be conducted into the performance o f PMBs.
PMBs are an important future dependent variable as they represent the full domain o f
protective behaviors which an insider can hold in his or her security behavioral repertoire.
Therefore, they allow for the investigation into a class o f behaviors rather than relegation
to specific behaviors.
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